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Abstract
Recent studies have shown information misuse is more abundant within organi-
zations, possibly from the modern proliferation of phishing and social engineering
attacks. To address this problem, security experts have proposed local, internal in-
spection, known as Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS). This technique
allows detection of malicious activity to occur at the endpoints – the individual hosts.
This research proposes Active Host-based Network Security Response (AHNSR):
a framework that utilizes HIDS with Software-Defined Networking (SDN) to enhance
system security by allowing dynamic active response and reconstruction from a global
network topology perspective. Vital to the operational architecture, SDN introduces
new programming capabilities that resolve the rigid configurations of traditional net-
works. This flexibility is essential in an era of rapidly evolving threats that require
unique and adaptive security defenses, as SDN-software solutions enable more flex-
ible security controls in both virtualized and enterprise environments. These SDN
security controls aim at providing access to legitimate users, protecting systems from
attacks, and providing mitigation or countermeasures when attacks do occur.
AHNSR is a complete and automated dynamic security solution, starting with
alert generation and ending with an appropriate SDN-enabled response on physical
switch flow tables. Responses include traffic redirection, host quarantining, filtering,
and more. SDN allows greater flexibility and command/control compared to legacy,
manual administrator response or the iptables solution of traditional IDS. By pushing
security event information to a global controller, immediate and intelligent changes
can be made for packet forwarding devices across the network. When, not if, an
attack occurs, AHNSR increases responsiveness while decreasing information damage
iv
– a goal every incident response team should have.
This research compares different methods of pushing security event information
from hosts and the resulting system performance at specified security level thresholds.
A testable SDN-controlled network is constructed with multiple hosts, OpenFlow en-
abled switches, and a Floodlight controller, all linked to a custom, novel interface for
the Open-Source SECurity (OSSEC) HIDS framework. OSSEC is implemented in a
server-agent architecture, allowing scalability and OS independence. System effective-
ness is evaluated against the following factors: alert density and selective Floodlight
module response types.. At the expected operational load of 500 events per second
(EPS), results reveal a mean system response time of 0.5564 seconds from log gener-
ation to flow table update via Floodlight’s Access Control List module. These results
demonstrate the AHNSR framework as a dependable (100% successful alert genera-
tion), effective (under 1 second), and efficient (under 35% CPU utilization) security
solution in the emulated test network. Load testing further assesses performance
of response methods at EPS levels 10—10000. A dynamic model is fit against the
data, allowing for performance estimates of dynamic response policies found in real
enterprise environments.
v
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ACTIVE RESPONSE USING HOST-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION
SYSTEM AND SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
The world is rapidly emerging as a network of networks, with millions of packet for-
warding devices responsible for the successful delivery of any request across the Inter-
net. However, traditional IP network configuration is complex, and once properly con-
figured, usually remains as a semi-static architecture. Inevitably, the exponentially-
advancing technology in the current age quickly outgrows the static limitations of
traditional networks. Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a possible solution to
this problem. It is an emerging networking paradigm that gives hope in solving the
limitations of current network infrastructures.
1.2 Problem Statement
According to annual cyber trend reports, half a billion personal records were stolen
or lost in 2015 [8]. There is no argument here: any “hackivist” or state-sponsored
entity has free reign on poorly-configured and vulnerable systems. Even well-vetted
commercial cyber defense systems can fall victim to a Zero-Day vulnerability or Ad-
vanced Persistent Threat (APT). Additionally, there is a trend of increasing insider
involvement in data breaches; while it only accounted for around 10 percent of data
breaches in 2014, insider involvement was present in 32 percent of the claims sub-
mitted in 2015. With more than three-quarters of surveyed US government agencies
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admitting they are more focused on combating insider threats today than one year
ago, it corroborates the significance of the problem.
Even though threat detection is possible through various Commercial-Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) products, it remains ineffective. Unfortunately, law enforcement and
third party notification remained the top breach discovery methods in 2015 [8]. In
2015, 92.9% of compromises took minutes or less to complete, and when companies
have to wait on external notification, it’s too late to secure, respond, and mitigate
the active threat [9]. Therefore, it is apparent there is a problem in real-time threat
detection and response from both external and internal originating intrusions.
Software-Defined Networking introduces a new framework for network configura-
tion, security, and management. Researchers are investigating and developing a wide
array of innovative and effective tools that utilize the fundamental architecture of a
global controller in a Software-Defined Network. These new tools may help prevent
and effectively respond to intrusions. When attackers gain unauthorized access to any
given machine, their most common goal is to move laterally to extract the most infor-
mation possible. Thus, the most effective methods in reducing data loss and damage
are 1) preventing lateral access to locally networked machines and 2) responding to
the breach as soon as possible.
1.3 Research Goals
In response to the problems of threat detection and response, this research seeks
to expand on a process of actively responding to local host-based security violations
by utilizing key technologies provided by Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems
in combination with Software-Defined Networking. The ideal system would integrate
seamlessly with existing systems, provide administrators with greater network control
and insight, and significantly reduce the possibility of data loss/theft while maintain-
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ing access to critical network services.
The research assesses the performance of four different methods to SDN response
demanding alerts, in which immediate network reconfiguration by a SDN controller
helps mitigate a potential active threat or intrusion. An open-source Host-based In-
trusion Detection System provides the detection and alert mechanism, whereas the
SDN controller is responsible for executing the response with flow table updates. The
SDN controller Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) provide the four evalu-
ated methods of responding to an alert: Firewall, Access Control List (ACL), Static
Flow Entry, and Log-Only. Each method helps meet specific data security compli-
ance requirements, such as those required by Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standards (PCI DSS) 2/3.2 and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA), which are furthered discussed in Section 2.7 [10] [11].
Specifically, this research seeks to expand on Todd’s Dynamic Security Control
System (DSCS), discussed in Section 2.9 [6]. The limitations of Todd’s previous work
in this area have been quantified, and this research seeks to mitigate shortcomings
and expand functionality in the following ways:
Limitation Mitigations
• The use of Floodlight’s stateless firewall could not interrupt active connections
if they were found to be malicious. This research seeks a viable solution.
• The DSCS system was not interfaced with an actual IDS. This research seeks
to use industry standard software (OSSEC) and its APIs to generate alerts.
Improvements
• A database schema is incorporated to allow alert sharing and archival tracking,
meeting standard logging policy requirements and improving scalability.
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• Different approaches to intrusion response (firewall or access control list up-
dates, first hop modifications, honeypot redirection, etc.) are allowed for more
dynamic control.
• The AMQP publisher/broker model can be replaced with a similar messaging
design within a Security Incident Management (SIM) or Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM) product.
• The programmability of the AMQP protocol can be replicated in a SDN en-
vironment because routing decisions are defined outside the network layer of
packet forwarding devices.
1.4 Hypothesis
This research hypothesizes as the aggregate number of logs being generated by
hosts increases, the response time will increase, the processor resource utilization will
also increase, and the alert generation rate will remain above the protocol standard
of 98%. At a normal operational load level, this research expects the average event
response time to be under 1 second for near real-time reactivity. Additionally, when
comparing the different response methods, the Access Control List response method
will outperform the Firewall response method in both quantitative and qualitative
metrics.
1.5 Approach
An experimental fully-switched network is configured, consisting of ten virtual
agents with host-based intrusion monitoring, one management server, and one SDN
controller. In order to emulate a full SDN network, packet forwarding is restricted to
OpenFlow enabled switches on real hardware. High resolution timing scripts are de-
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ployed and log generation is controlled while monitoring system performance through
the detection/response workflow. An active response script is developed to query
different modules provided by the SDN controller.
1.6 Assumptions/Limitations
The following assumptions/limitations are understood when designing and exe-
cuting experiments for the active response system:
• The framework is dependent on well-configured host auditing and logging poli-
cies, as well as appropriate rule definitions on the management server.
• Triggers and definitions are limited by the features provided by the Host-based
IDS utilized in the research, Open Source SECurity (OSSEC), version 2.9 RC3.
More specifically, alert triggers are limited to system log analysis, application
log analysis, connection status, rootkit signature detection, selective registry
changes, and/or selective file changes.
• Rule definitions are limited to the following: alert level, specific rule ID, event
frequency, maximum size, time frame, category, source IP, destination IP, user-
name, hostname, program name, URL, and/or matching regex parameters.
• This research does not examine identification accuracy (e.g., false positive fre-
quency) or use any datasets of captured attacks.
• The Floodlight controller has out-of-band management to all switches in the
network. If this is not true, it does not ensure dedicated OpenFlow channels
that may become congested otherwise, which can invalidate the observed results.
• All switches must support OpenFlow 1.3 or higher, as some response modules
require features in these versions.
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• A pre-configured flow is utilized for proactive forwarding to the IDS server. This
would not be possible in a pure reactive forwarding environment.
• CPU utilization data collection frequency is limited to at most once per second.
This reduces the sample size for this metric significantly and can potentially be
inaccurate or inconsistent between trials.
1.7 Contributions
This thesis contributes to the general SDN body of research. It helps answer
questions about how SDN can be utilized in further securing local area networks
by providing interfaces to already existing systems. It provides empirical evidence
that a complete SDN-interfaced intrusion detection and response action is capable of
actively mitigating threats in near real-time.
1.8 Thesis Overview
This thesis document is arranged in six chapters. Chapter 2 presents fundamental
concepts of networking, SDN, IDS, and other relevant research. Chapter 3 discusses
the system design details and the necessary configuration in implementing an active
response. The experiment methodology is presented in Chapter 4 along with the
standard parameters, metrics, and testing process. Chapter 5 covers the results and
necessary statistical analysis of the collected data. Lastly, Chapter 6 summarizes the
research and discusses potential opportunities for future work in this domain.
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II. Background and Related Research
2.1 Overview
This chapter discusses Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS), and the relevant bodies of research. Section 2.1 discusses the history
of networking and the motivation of SDN development, while Section 2.2 further
explains SDN fundamental components. Several application and use case proposals
are addressed in Section 2.3, along with current research trends in this domain. One
of these areas is security, which is discussed further Section 2.4, from both potential
weakness and strength perspectives. In Sections 2.5 and 2.6, high-level concepts of
Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems and the Advanced Message Queuing Protocol
are introduced respectively, as they play key roles in the research methodology for
security policy enforcement using SDN.
2.2 Networking
In order to reliably send data from one host to another, computers depend on
switches, routers, and other packet forwarding devices to pass along the message. This
is necessary for both inter and intra network communication. Data is encapsulated
into packets and sent across various mediums utilizing transport and network layer
protocols, most notably the Transport Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol
(IP). These protocols establish a standard “language” and delivery method for the
majority of traffic on the Internet. However, all machines cannot be directly connected
to one another. Thus, packet forwarding devices act as the highway intersections,
directing traffic towards individual, appropriate destinations.
Computer networks can be divided into three functional planes: data, control, and
management [12]. The data plane is where the networking devices reside and is where
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the raw bits are forwarded through to the next device. The control plane represents
the protocols used to populate the forwarding tables of the data plane elements.
Lastly, the management plane represents the services, software, and protocols used to
remotely monitor and configure the control plane. Figure 1 depicts the combination of
these three planes in a top-down, streamlined process of policy development to policy
execution. Network policy is defined in the management plane, which is enforced via
the control plane and ultimately executed at the physical data plane.
The most significant limitation of current packet forwarding devices is caused by
their implementation of these three functional planes. Switches were designed to be
resilient and independently capable, which resulted in a tight coupling of the data
and control planes. Therefore, the routers are responsible for both packet forwarding
(data plane), as well as managing a variety of distributed routing algorithms (control
plane). The control plane is responsible for any extra processing (e.g., Link Layer
Discover Protocol, Border Gateway Protocol) that is necessary to perform the basic
data plane activities. Unfortunately routers are doing all of this extra work themselves
in tracking topology changes, computing routes, and installing forwarding rules. In
this framework, the devices themselves are independently responsible for both man-
aging and executing their own forwarding tables. This breeds a decentralized, static
Figure 1. Layered view of the functional networking planes [1]
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architecture – a contributing factor to the difficulty of innovation in this domain.
2.2.1 History.
There have been three distinct phases in the demands of networking over the past
20 years. Beginning in the late 1990s, as the Internet became a consumable service
in both business and home, the focus was almost exclusively on bandwidth. Data
rates were the only metric in considering the performance of file transportation from
point A to point B. It did not matter how data got to a destination. However, as
more services and protocols were introduced in networking, specifically Real-Time
Communication (RTC) traffic, a new performance metric was introduced: latency.
In the 2005 time-frame, with the advent of video and audio streaming services
such as YouTube, Skype, and Voice Over IP (VoIP), network administrators began
to realize that latency was a real challenge with these services. This problem occurs
because the service depends on delivery timing of individual packets, far different
from the former concept of getting an entire file to a destination regardless of actual
semantics. But as internal network RTC traffic volume increased, competition of those
“intersection” resources at packet forwarding devices demanded the need to prioritize
traffic type. As a result, Quality of Service (QoS) was introduced to prioritize the
forwarding of individual packets (e.g., RTC traffic) to reduce latency for those services.
Moving forward to present-day, networks have become increasingly complex. With
more devices and more services than ever before, it is becoming clear that QoS stan-
dards cannot accurately prioritize traffic all of the time. It is limited by strict as-
sumptions, and fails to allow administrators to dynamically model and shape their
traffic depending on the real-time needs of a business. There is a desperate need to
programmatically respond to network resource demand by modifying certain priori-
tization and flow controls.
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2.2.2 SDN Origination.
SDN, in its simplest form, is pulling away the intelligence from switch hardware.
This trend is already occurring in other domains with positive results. For example,
file servers were originally dedicated to a particular service and all permissions, data,
assets, and physical components were managed in a self-contained unit. These servers
have been replaced by Storage Area Networks (SAN), allowing a consolidation of file
systems to abstract the connections from a single operating system [13]. Similarly,
virtualization tools are helping create multiple instances of software operate on the
same hardware.
Investigating the history of basic computing reveals this trend. Nick McKeown
highlights in Figure 2 the similarities between legacy mainframe computers and tra-
ditional networking devices [2]. Both incorporate specialized applications, operating
systems, and hardware in a vertically-locked environment. The shift to personal com-
puting was revolutionary, yet required the separation of hardware and intelligence.
While this trend grew rapidly in these other domains, the traditional IP networking
architecture failed to follow suit – until SDN was introduced.
Vertically integrated 
Closed, proprietary 
Slow innovation 
Small industry 
Specialized 
Operating 
System 
Specialized 
Hardware 
App*App*App*App*App*App*App*App*App*App*App*
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Open interfaces 
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Huge industry 
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Open Interface 
Linux* Mac*OS*
Windows*
(OS)* or or 
Open Interface 
Mainframes(
(a) Mainframe computer framework
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App*App*App*App*App*App*App*App*App*App*App*
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Open interfaces 
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Control*
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Control*
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Control*
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Open Interface 
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(b) Traditional networking framework
Figure 2. Decoupling applications, operating systems, and hardware in network devices
is similar to the transition in personal computing [2]
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SDN originated from the work at Stanford University in 2007 by researcher Martin
Casado [14]. His team successfully decoupled the control and data planes, resulting in
the development of OpenFlow (OF), an open-source communication protocol used in
the “southbound” control channel, which has become the standard interface between
servers and SDN-enabled switches. Shifting the intelligence away from the physi-
cal forwarding devices allows more flexibility in networking configuration than ever
before.
According to the Open Networking Foundation (ONF), SDN is defined as a net-
work architecture that “decouples the network control and forwarding functions en-
abling the network control to become directly programmable and the underlying
infrastructure to be abstracted for applications and network services” [15]. Kreutz et
al go further in [1], defining SDN with four pillars:
1. The control plane functionality is decoupled from the data plan network devices.
2. Forwarding decisions are “flow” based versus strictly destination based (flows
are defined in Section 2.3.2).
3. Control logic is executed on an external device: the SDN controller.
4. Software applications running on top of the SDN controller are capable of in-
teracting with the underlying data plane devices.
When a network builds upon these four pillars, it successfully forces the separation
of management and execution.
2.3 SDN Components
By nature of the four pillars described, SDN requires distinct components that
have already been mentioned in theory. Figure 3 depicts the SDN architecture and
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its fundamental components. This section discusses the three central components
unique to SDN: the Network Operating System, the southbound interface, and the
northbound interfaces.
Figure 3. SDN components [1]
2.3.1 Controller: A Networking Operating System.
The controller, also known as the Network Operating System (NOS), is arguably
the most important component in the SDN architecture. The purpose of any operat-
ing system is to provide abstraction to higher level applications and communication
to lower level components. It is also responsible for managing those resources and
services. SDN incorporates this same paradigm in delivering and facilitating network
management. At a minimum, a NOS provides the following functionality: maintain
network state and topology information, discover new devices, and distribute network
12
configuration settings [12].
When designing the NOS architecture, the most significant consideration is whether
it operates in a distributed or centralized structure. A centralized controller man-
ages all data plane devices as a single entity. NOX, Floodlight, and Beacon have
been designed as such [15]. However, centralized systems may introduce danger as a
single point of failure; this threat has motivated others to develop distributed NOS
controllers. Another advantage of a distributed system is scalability. Onix, ONOS,
and Hyperflow are examples of distributed controllers, all capable of higher degrees
of availability and resiliency by their fault tolerant design [16].
In this research, the Floodlight controller is used. It is an enterprise-class, Apache-
licensed, and Java-based OpenFlow controller. This controller is selected due to its
community support, open-source code base, centralized design, and implementation
of a northbound interface.
2.3.2 Southbound Interface.
The southbound interface is the link between the NOS and the packet forwarding
devices. The most commonly accepted protocol for this communication is Casado’s
OpenFlow, which provides three sources of information for NOSs [14]. First, reactive
messages are sent to the controller whenever links drop or port changes occur. Second,
flow statistics and corresponding updates are sent to the controller. Last, “packet-in”
messages are sent across the southbound interface whenever the switches/routers do
not know what action to take on an incoming flow.
A flow is an important concept in SDN, and consists of three parts: 1) a matching
rule, 2) actions to perform on matching packets, and 3) counters for statistical use.
Flow generation is accomplished by utilizing the Ternary Content Addressable Mem-
ories (TCAMs) that are already implemented by forwarding tables in typical modern
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switching equipment [17]. The advantage in SDN is that flows are generated with
a global perspective of the network. Flow rules are determined at the control and
management level, and then disseminated throughout the network.
Figure 4 shows how upon packet arrival, if a match is determined against a rule in
a flow entry, the corresponding action occurs. For example, it can forward to either
a physical or virtual port, en-queue to a particular port, encapsulate and send to the
controller, modify existing fields, or simply drop the packet. “Table Chaining” also
introduces hierarchical look-up options by having an action link to another flow table
or even a group table, defined as a specialized table which resembles a set of multiple
actions to execute [1].
Figure 4. How flow tables are used in the SDN architecture [1]
Flow entries may be issued on a hard timeout or idle timeout basis. A hard
timeout signals the switch or router to remove the entry after its single use, while
an idle timeout allows the entry to remain until it has had no matches for a certain
amount of time. Timeouts are helpful because a single flow can be decided once
against the first packet in a targeted TCP connection and then used repeatedly for
subsequent forwarding, increasing performance.
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2.3.3 Northbound Interface.
The northbound interface is mainly a software domain that allows network ap-
plications to function independent from the lower level SDN implementation, but
also enables dynamic control of actual network resources. The Open Networking
Foundation (ONF) framework describes customer and business applications having
abstracted views and the ability to program specific needs across multiple domains
[15].
While OpenFlow has emerged as the de facto standard on the southbound inter-
face, there is not an equivalent Application Programmable Interface (API) adoption
for its counterpart north side. Whatever the case may be, an open-source north-
bound interface is extremely important in keeping true portability and interoperabil-
ity among SDN platforms.
2.3.4 Special/Optional Components.
Depending on the SDN deployment environment, there may be special require-
ments or optional features that help improve performance. For example, in a dis-
tributed controller environment, East/Westbound APIs are a special component in-
volved. This horizontal interface is responsible for exchanging data between con-
trollers, running consistency checks, and monitoring controller function status. SDNi
is a protocol developed to coordinate flow setup across these distributed platforms
[18].
In addition, the concept of virtualization allows an entire SDN to live as a virtual
network. Open vSwitch is an open source virtual switch that can run as a stand-
alone hypervisor switch, or as a distributed switch across multiple servers. The virtual
switching occurs within the Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) and can therefore avoid
physical hardware limitations. For example, Open vSwitch uses Link Aggregation
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Control Protocol (LCAP), a method of combining multiple physical ports to form a
single logical channel in parallel [19].
2.4 Use Cases and Applications
The programmability of SDN has presented a variety of use cases for real world
scenarios. This section discusses a few examples, and explains how the benefits of
SDN contributes to their potential.
2.4.1 Access Control.
In a dynamic access control model, SDN allows forwarding devices to “inspect”
the first packet on any connection. They can then consult the access control policy via
pre-determined flows in their tables (proactive modeling) or request an access policy
from the controller (reactive modeling). SDN allows these rules to be instantiated
at a global level to block or route traffic appropriately, and do not require manual
configuration at each switch/router in the internal network. This research utilizes
Floodlight’s proactive access control module as one response method.
2.4.2 Mobility and Migration.
SDN provides the ability for seamless migration of mobile clients. If a host mi-
grates to a new location on the network, controller topology visibility is able to signal
the change, and modify rules/routing information to optimally reroute traffic imme-
diately.
2.4.3 Fault Tolerance.
A major issue with Shortest Path First (SPF) routing algorithms found on many
networks today is the problem of non-deterministic failures. The failure of a link
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between two nodes affects all nodes that use this link to reach some destinations.
These nodes will change their routing tables and send out routing updates the first-
hop devices, essentially competing over alternate links in the network. Latency is
involved during the rebuild, and the algorithm’s non-deterministic nature does not
guarantee the rebuild is the most optimal solution [20].
Alternatively, SDN guarantees fault tolerance by having an accurate global topol-
ogy. When a link fails in a SDN environment, the controller can immediately establish
optimal new flows for all connections affected by the fault.
2.4.4 Dynamic Service Bandwidth.
Bandwidth throttling is a current network practice designed to place limitations
on the data capacity of certain services. For example, a company may allocate a
maximum of 15% of their total bandwidth for File Transfer Protocol (FTP) traf-
fic, 25% for VoIP traffic, and so forth. Even large cellular providers like T-Mobile
automatically throttle bandwidth demanding video streaming traffic down to 480p
resolution quality [21]. These throttles are strict boundaries manually configured at
the currently coupled data/control plane. A consequence of bandwidth throttling is
the lack of flexibility and utilization efficiency. The system is difficult to change and
often results in unused bandwidth.
SDN offers the flexible and efficient solution of dynamic service bandwidth. This
can meet the changing demands of a company’s network as it grows, adds services,
and responds to certain events. Additionally, bandwidth requesting becomes pos-
sible, where a traffic engineering server (possibly integrated into the NOS) receives
bandwidth requests from applications. This reactive model presents a new concept
of “on-demand” networking, where the network shapes itself based upon endpoint
devices, considering their roles and needs.
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Furthermore, Eli Etherton presents a possible use case of this dynamic control as
an emergency alert system [22]. At the push of a button, SDN can shift all internal
bandwidth to deliver pertinent emergency information, possibly allowing real-time
high definition streaming to all end users of emergency notifications and instructions.
Current networks would choke under QoS and divisional constraints, but SDN’s adap-
tive abilities can overcome those limitations.
2.4.5 Current Research Areas.
SDN is still in the early stages of adoption and standardization. However, there
are some themes in current research areas [1].
• Scalability: Partitioning and replicating the controller state to segment man-
agement as networks grow [23].
• Testing and Debugging: Since the network depends on the execution of a
program, bugs can be introduced. There is a need for testing techniques specific
for controller applications [24].
• Network Function Virtualization (NFV): Moving current application layer
services (DHCP, DNS, etc.) to layer 3 network services [25].
• Migration: Implementing hybrid deployment environments to ease the transi-
tion into a full-scale SDN replacement [26].
• Software-Defined Environments (SDE): Combining SDN with software-
defined storage, software-defined computation, and software-defined manage-
ment [27].
• Security and Dependability: Using technologies to improve resiliency and
mitigating unrealized security threats on the control platform [28] [29].
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This research looks at the themes of Security, Dependability and NFV by moving
network security services closer to the network controller.
2.5 Security
While research and experimentation continue to develop with SDN, security con-
tinues to be a top priority. The ability to view network status in real-time and
programmatically control network behavior is a two sided coin: it opens new avenues
of attack vectors for malicious users, but also grants the possibility of providing fur-
ther software-based security services. Ali et al divide current SDN-based security into
two categories: protect the network or provide security as a service [30].
2.5.1 Attack Vectors.
There are three new attack vectors introduced in an SDN environment [31]:
1. Controller: As mentioned earlier, pulling the network intelligence to a single
system naturally makes the controller a high profile target. If the NOS is
compromised, the forwarding devices it controls will be affected as well.
2. Southbound Interface: This is an interesting attack vector because it takes
advantage of the fact that control messages must now occur between devices
and the controller. If this OpenFlow communication is not sent over a secure
channel, malicious users may be able to apply traditional techniques such as
spoofing and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks to issue their own commands
to switches and/or routers.
3. Flow Entries: Since flow rules are established at the management level, there
may be errors in policy and decision making. Therefore, attackers may at-
tempt to reverse engineer the flow tables and pinpoint weaknesses in the actual
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implementation.
Additionally, a security assessment of the OpenFlow protocol presented a number
of issues. The STRIDE methodology [3], summarized in Figure 5, identifies different
attacks, examples, as well as their properties in reference the Confidentiality, Integrity,
and Availability (CIA) triad [32].
Figure 5. Possible attacks on OpenFlow enabled networks [3]
2.5.2 Securing Using SDN.
Despite the introduction of new attack vectors, SDN also provides the ability to
build application-level security for an entire network. The first direction of security
mitigation efforts focuses on threat detection, remediation, and verification using
SDN.
As examples, the controller may be able to infer a Denial of Service (DoS) attack
from the internal network state, and respond by dynamically reprogramming the de-
vices at gateway locations to drop the malicious traffic flow. RadWare has developed
DefenseFlow [33], a commercially-available SDN application that does exactly this.
DefenseFlow instructs the controller to collect statistics on traffic flow at a per second
resolution, establishing baseline measurements to detect any patterns of suggestive
DoS attacks.
Dealing with threat remediation, the only possible response in traditional net-
works is to drop the offending the traffic. SDN, however, with its real-time program-
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ming ability, gives a richer set of dynamic responses, including “emergency alarms,
dynamic quarantine solutions, traffic redirection for forensics, and entrapment mech-
anisms such as tarpits and honeypots” [30]. For instance, the FRESCO Application
layer prototype, propose by Shin et al, provides a Python scripting API that allows
programmers to develop reusable flow rule configuration modules. These modules are
overseen by FORTNOX, a specialized security enforcement kernel supplement in the
controller. Using FRESCO, the authors built Reflector Net, an application that de-
tects and reroutes malicious scanners to isolated honeynets [34]. That traffic can then
be dissected, promoting defense intelligence, instead of being immediately dropped
at the network perimeter.
SDN can also provide subscription-like security, enabling services such as anonymiza-
tion, enhanced trust, and remote management. AnonyFlow is a service that theo-
retically allows an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to dynamically and temporarily
assign IP addresses and flow-based identifiers to their customers [35]. This would al-
low ISPs to mimic hierarchical network address translation (NAT) for entire regions
or sub-regions.
SDN can also be utilized to secure data offloading from mobile and Bring-Your-
Own-Devices (BYOD). There may exist a need to offload sensitive data from these
devices for further processing, sharing, or archival. Enterprise-Centric Offloading Sys-
tem (ECOS) is an enterprise-wide solution, enabling a SDN controller to negotiate
with mobile applications on data offloading, encryption feasibility, privacy require-
ments, and more [36].
2.6 Intrusion Detection Systems
In [37] Kizza describes the fundamentals of network intrusion detection and pre-
vention. An intrusion is defined as a deliberate attempt, successful or not, to break
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into, access, manipulate, or misuse some valuable property. The Department of De-
fense (DoD) is responsible for an extensive amount of valuable property, in the form
of national intelligence, personnel files, and any other classified information.
To protect this data, one or many Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are used to
detect unauthorized intrusions into a network. Historically, Network-based Intrusion
Detection Systems (NIDS), like SNORT [38], have been used to monitor network
traffic from an external, passive perspective. Port mirroring is often utilized to submit
network traffic to an IDS, which will then perform an anomaly and/or signature-based
analysis.
However, recent studies [39] [40] [41] have shown that information misuse is more
abundant within organizations, possibly from the modern proliferation of phishing and
social engineering attacks. To address this problem, security experts have proposed
local, internal inspections, known as Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS).
This technique allows detection to occur at the endpoints, on individual hosts. This
research utilizes an HIDS framework introduced in Section 2.7.
2.6.1 Alert Generation.
HIDS use software to monitor specific logs on the target systems. There are three
models of generating alerts:
1. Anomaly-based detection: These systems compare network activity to a
fingerprint profile of “normal” activity. Any user behavior or system resource
usage that deviates from the norm may indicate an intrusion. Training datasets
are often used to establish the normal baseline.
2. Signature-based detection: These systems assume each intrusive activity
can be individually identified by a unique pattern or signature. They work by
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keeping an updated database of known malicious signatures and looking for
these in current network activity.
3. Hybrid detection: Because of the potential shortcomings in both anomaly
and signature based detection, a hybrid model combines both sources for alert
generation.
The HIDS in this research utilizes a hybrid model in generating alerts.
2.6.2 Incident Response.
While much time is spent optimizing intrusion detection and prevention systems,
there is little guidance offered for when an incident does occur. Network administra-
tors have to invest in building a custom incident response strategy; if this is weak, it
undermines the entire protection infrastructure.
The SANS institute suggests a simple tiered response and escalation procedure
for detected intrusions [42]:
• Level 1: “Unfriendly” but harmless activity, such as port scanning. The re-
sponse should be 1) record user/IP/domain of intruder, and 2) maintain vigi-
lance for future intrusions.
• Level 2: An unsuccessful, yet clear attempt to obtain unauthorized information
(password files, access restricted hosts, etc.). The response should be 1) research
the attack origin, 2) analyze results, and 3) identify intrusion method risks.
• Level 3: Serious or successful attempt to breach security. The response should
be 1) contain the intrusion immediately, 2) collect and protect information, 3)
eliminate related vulnerabilities.
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2.7 OSSEC: Open Source SECurity
OSSEC is an open-source HIDS platform capable of incident detection, response,
and information management. It functions in either a local or server/agent deploy-
ment and can provide host-based monitoring across Linux, Solaris, AIX, HP-UX,
BSD, Windows, Mac and VMware ESX systems. OSSEC is used by Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), universities, government agencies, and even large corporate data
centers (Atomicorp, Wazuh) as their primary HIDS solution [43]. AlienVault’s Uni-
fied Security Management (USM) subscription product also uses OSSEC in their core
functionality.
OSSEC helps customers meet file integrity monitoring, log inspection/monitoring,
and policy enforcement requirements by providing these key features [43]:
1. Log Analysis: OSSEC collects, analyzes, and correlates logs generated by
operating systems, applications, and devices. This feature covers PCI DSS
Section 10.
2. File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Independent hosts can detect changes to
any file and provide alerts when changes occur. This feature covers PCI DSS
Sections 11.5 and 10.5.5.
3. Registry Integrity Checking: Similar to file integrity monitoring, agents can
run checks against system registry values and alert when changes occur. This
feature also covers PCI DSS Sections 11.5 and 10.5.5.
4. Host-based Anomaly Checking: OSSEC runs UNIX-based rootkit detection
scripts that can detect when a system is modified in a way matching common
rootkit methods. For example, it looks for the presence of hidden processes by
using getsid() and kill() to check if any pid is being used or not. If the pid
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is being used, but “ps” cannot see it, this likely indicates the presence of a
kernel-level rootkit or a trojaned version of “ps”.
5. Active Response: This feature allows OSSEC to take immediate action when
any specific (or generic) alert occurs.
Figure 6 shows OSSEC’s structure and delegation between the management server
and agents. Agents collect log files, command output, and maintain a small database
for file integrity checking. However, the server is responsible for analysis through
log decoding, archiving alerts, alerting through email, and initiating active response
scripts.
Figure 6. OSSEC architecture [4]
OSSEC has an extensive code-base with active community development. It comes
with hundreds of log decoders in a default installation and is customizable to ad-
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ditional applications. Additionally, it offers the flexibility of “agentless” monitoring
for systems such as routers, firewalls, etc. This feature allows it to stack intrusion
detection power with other network-based products like SNORT while maintaining a
centralized management architecture.
2.8 Advanced Message Queuing Protocol
Enterprise developers adopted Message Oriented Middleware (MOM) because of
the desire for flexible communication while remaining reliable and secure. MOM
allows efficient message delivery between applications on heterogeneous systems, ef-
fectively bypassing the expensive use of explicit connections like Virtual Private Net-
works (VPNs). Usually, this is accomplished with asynchronous message delivery
through a queue framework directly on the MOM middleware. The Advanced Mes-
sage Queuing Protocol (AMQP) aspires to define MOM, and has been widely adopted
as an open standard for “business messaging” [44].
AMQP originated in 2006 due to the demand of interoperability within the finan-
cial services industry [45]. It was developed as a binary, wire-level protocol, meaning
the message format is strictly machine-readable as a stream of octets [46]. Its ubiq-
uitous and pervasive nature allows AMQP to be highly scalable, proving itself as a
high performance, fault-tolerant, and lossless messaging infrastructure. Security and
message integrity is implemented through mutual authentication and the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) encryption scheme. Figure 7 displays how AMQP relies upon
a publish-and-subscribe model, consisting of three primary components:
• Publishers: Clients generating the messages
• Broker: A server or daemon program containing an exchange, one or more
routing engines, and message queues
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• Consumers: Clients consuming one or more messages from the queue(s) on
the broker
Figure 7. AMQP architecture [5]
2.8.1 Brokers.
The broker’s role is to receive messages from the publisher applications and route
them to the appropriate consumer. This transfer is first accomplished using an ex-
change module, which acts as a mailbox for any incoming messages. Exchanges then
copy and distribute the message to outbound queues using binding rules. The ac-
tual delivery is initiated by the broker if the consumer is subscribed to the queue, or
consumers can fetch/pull messages at their discretion.
As a programmable protocol, AMQP routing is defined at the application layer,
then executed at the network layer. As a result, it is possible to build a scalable
broker topology using a k-nomial tree scheme, varying in both depth and breadth
[47]. While this only applies to a disjoint federation architecture, custom topologies
can meet the routing needs of the target system.
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2.8.2 RabbitMQ.
RabbitMQ is an open-source middleware, specifically acting as a message broker
and queuing server. It supports many messaging protocols, including AMQP. In a
multi-broker model, RabbitMQ can either be clustered together (forming a single, log-
ical broker) or loosely connected through federation or tree structures. Additionally,
it is officially supported on several operating systems and programming languages,
including Java, Python, and C/C++ [5].
2.9 Related Research
This research aims to assist in the intrusion response process by utilizing SDN
and HIDS together in a harmonious system with efficient message passing. Figure 8
illustrates Michael Todd’s Dynamic Security Control using SDN (DSCS) system pro-
posal and how these can work together to provide an immediate response to actively
quarantine potential intrusions. HIDS monitors the critical end systems, generating
alerts which are passed to the AMQP Broker. A SDN controller subscribes to these
alerts, and a network application interacts with the Northbound API in response to
the alert. All of these components working together results in dynamic and automated
flow table updates which monitor, isolate, and block security policy violations.
The limitations of Todd’s previous work have been quantified, and this research
seeks to mitigate shortcomings and expand functionality in the following ways:
• The use of Floodlight’s stateless firewall could not interrupt active connections
if they were found malicious. This research seeks a viable solution.
• The DSCS system was not interfaced with an actual IDS. This research seeks to
use industry standard software (e.g., OSSEC) and its APIs to generate alerts.
• A database schema could be incorporated to allow alert sharing and archival
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tracking, meeting standard logging policy requirements and improving scalabil-
ity.
• Different approaches to intrusion response (firewall updates, first hop modifi-
cations, honeypot redirection, etc.) can be tested for performance, efficiency,
and/or latency.
• The AMQP publisher/broker model can be replaced with a similar messaging
design within a Security Incident Management (SIM) or Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM) product.
• The programmability of the AMQP protocol can be replicated in a SDN en-
vironment because routing decisions are defined outside the network layer of
packet forwarding devices.
Figure 8. Dynamic Security Control using SDN (DSCS) process [6]
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2.10 Conclusion
This chapter explains SDN’s differences between basic networking and its his-
torical development. It describes the fundamental components of SDN’s framework,
and presents use cases of how it can help improve network capabilities. Lastly, it
explores both the security liabilities and potential security applications that SDN
could provide. The critical, legacy-style role of network architecture may make SDN
a slow adopting technology, but the flexibility of dynamic programming proves itself
priceless.
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III. AHNSR Design
3.1 Overview
This research introduces the Active Host-based Network Security Response (AHNSR)
framework, a redesign of the DSCS process discussed in Section 2.9. This chapter
provides a detailed description of each component in the AHNSR system and its role
in the experiment. In understanding the key technologies in SDN, the four main com-
ponents of this new system under test can be defined: agent, OSSEC, flow profile,
and the SDN controller. The interface between OSSEC and the SDN controller is a
novel contribution that enables a well-vetted, open-source HIDS platform for generat-
ing security events. A testable SDN-controlled network is constructed with multiple
hosts, OpenFlow enabled switches, and a Floodlight controller, all linked to the novel
interface for the HIDS framework.
3.2 System Summary
Figure 9 displays a simplified network diagram of all components described in the
AHNSR design: SDN controller, OSSEC server, switches, and workstation agents.
The boundaries are limited to these components, and do not include other services
normally present in an enterprise network. However, as discussed later in Chapter
4, the test network does attempt to more accurately represent a real-world network
by utilizing physical switches instead of virtual switches. Therefore, all Ethernet
communication (including OpenFlow) between any two hosts are physically trans-
mitted through independent network interface cards instead of residing within the
same virtual bridge.
Figure 10 provides a high-level view of the AHNSR system, describing the inter-
action between each component. The process follows this cycle:
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Figure 9. Network diagram of AHNSR components
1. Individual agents register and connect with the OSSEC server during deploy-
ment/configuration in a Software-Defined Network. While connected, OSSEC
continually monitors the agents using multi-log analysis, rootkit detection, and
file integrity checking. Based on rule-sets and threshold levels that represent
the enterprise IT policy, security alerts are generated when an event occurs on
any monitored agent.
2. The OSSEC server decodes, analyzes, and determines the appropriate active
response to protect the network.
3. A custom active-response script then interacts with a secure REpresentational
State Transfer (REST) API of the SDN controller in order to request flow entries
be pushed to network switches.
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4. The SDN controller then communicates via OpenFlow channels to the physical
switches
5. These switches, in turn, accept the flow tables updates which ultimately isolate,
block, or redirect traffic.
Figure 10. AHNSR system design
3.3 SDN Controller
The SDN controller is implemented using the master branch of open-source Flood-
light project (commits made up to 23 September 2016), using a Java 1.8 compatible
update. Figure 11 shows the relationship among the Floodlight controller, the ap-
plications built as Java modules within Floodlight, and the applications built over
33
the Floodlight REST API [7]. Internally, the Floodlight controller contains a set of
common functionalities that control and inquire about an OpenFlow network, while
applications on top of it utilize different features to solve user needs throughout the
network.
Figure 11. Floodlight architecture and module interaction [7]
Upon execution, Floodlight and its set of Java module applications (those loaded
in the Floodlight properties file) begin their services. The REST APIs exposed by
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all running modules are available via the specified REST port (8080 and 8081 for
HTTP/HTTPS, respectively). These modules allow the normally-abstracted OSSEC
server to also function as a pseudo-REST application, and can retrieve information
by invoking services through JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) constructed com-
mands/requests sent to the controller REST port via HTTP/HTTPS. This request
is demonstrated in Section 3.4.4, OSSEC’s SDN response.
This research selectively utilizes Floodlight’s StaticFlowEntryPusher, ACL (Ac-
cess Control List) and Firewall Java module applications. These modules allow the
AHNSR system to control flows at a very fine level, bypassing some limitations in
previous related work. For example, active malicious connections can be immediately
terminated by forcing the switch to create a new static flow, consequentially dropping
those packets. However, these modules operate differently – the Firewall module uses
reactive flow entries while the ACL and Static Flow Entry modules use proactive flow
entries.
3.3.1 Reactive/Proactive Flow Entry.
Figure 12 illustrates the difference between reactive and proactive operations. The
Firewall module is designed reactively, meaning the switch must ask the controller how
to handle new packets. After receiving the switch’s OpenFlow PACKET IN message,
the controller triggers the Firewall module. This module operates by comparing each
incoming PACKET IN message against its pre-configured allow/deny list from the
highest priority until either a match is found or the list is exhausted. If a match is
found, the rule’s action (ALLOW or DENY) is stored in a IRoutingDecision object
to be passed on to the rest of the packet-in processing pipeline, which normally ends
with the default Forwarding module. The forwarding module then reactively inserts
flows in switches, effectively routing packets from the source to its destination.
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Figure 12. Reactive vs. proactive Floodlight modules
Alternatively, proactive flow entries are sent by the controller before the switch
handles incoming packets. This requires a single OpenFlow FLOW MOD message –
then all subsequent matching flows are automatically forwarded at line speed.
Both reactive and proactive methods are used in this research as they are inde-
pendently executed by the Java application modules.
3.4 OSSEC Configuration
OSSEC is installed in a server/agent architecture, where agents communicate with
a server for centralized analysis. The server and Linux agents are running OSSEC’s
pre-release of version 2.9 (v2.9.0 RC3), while the Windows workstations are running
OSSEC version 2.8.3 (the latest version available for Windows clients). Figure 13
provides a high-level view of the agent/server log flow and the various processes
handling each action:
1. Agents are responsible for log collecting using the ossec-logcollector process.
New log entries are forwarded to the server securely via UDP port 1514 using
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messages encrypted with the blowfish algorithm and compressed using zlib [48].
This network communication is handled by the agentd and remoted processes,
located agent-side and server-side respectively.
2. The server’s ossec-analysisd process decodes the log using regex parameters,
determines the format, then matches it to any defined rules.
3. The server’s ossec-dbd process is responsible for storing alerts into a database,
while the ossec-execd process executes any active-response actions that may be
necessary for the corresponding alert.
Figure 13. OSSEC log flow in a server/agent architecture
3.4.1 Agents.
Since the agents are responsible for monitoring log files, the experiment uses a
simplified, consolidated adaptation to simulate security events logged to various places
on the workstation. During configuration, an empty plain-text file is created on
each agent, representing a no-noise syslog file. In order to have each agent’s ossec-
logcollector process actively monitor the experimentation log, this research includes
a localfile element pointing to the local experimentation log. The format is specified
as syslog – a generic format which parses one log per line.
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3.4.2 Decoder/Rules.
Log rules are stored internally on the server in an eXtensible Markup Language
(XML) tree structure, independent of the initial log format. For AHNSR experiments,
this research constructs a custom decoder and ruleset to simulate security events by
adding the following construct to /var/ossec/etc/decoder.xml on the OSSEC server:
1 <decoder name="experiment1">
2 <prematch>^experiment1</prematch>
3 </decoder>
4 <decoder name="experiment-alert">
5 <parent>experiment1</parent>
6 <regex offset="after_parent">^an event occurred. LEVEL=(\d+)
ID=(\d+)</regex>
7 <order>extra_data, id</order>
8 </decoder>
This decoder successfully consumes any logs with the pattern “experiment1: an
event occurred. LEVEL=# ID=#” Decoders provide a way to extract field data
from the message to be used in context - this decoder utilizes this by extracting the
level information and storing it as extra data variable. The fields are described as
follows:
• Level: This is a threat severity level index used internally in the OSSEC IDS
framework. Every rule is classified from the lowest threat (00) to the maximum
level (15). The descriptions for each level are provided in Appendix M.
• Log ID: This is the log ID generated by the agents when they write a new
line to the log file. It is used for message tracking during the tests.
• Alert ID: This is a unique identifier assigned by OSSEC for every alert it
generates. The number also acts as the primary key for the alert database
described in Section 3.4.5.
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Once a log is decoded to a specific format, rules can be applied toward the ex-
tracted information. For example, a Secure Shell (SSH) rule may extract the source
IP address when a decoder identifies the format of a failed authentication log - which
means it can use that information in generating an informative alert for administra-
tive action. For this experiment, decoding should match the simulated security level
to the alert level, so the following rules are constructed on the OSSEC server, in the
/var/ossec/rules/ossec rules.xml file like so:
1 <group name="experiment1">
2 <rule id="109000" level="0">
3 <decoded_as>experiment1</decoded_as>
4 <description>custom experiment alert</description>
5 </rule>
6 <!-- Alert for level 1 -->
7 <rule id="109001" level="1">
8 <if_sid>109000</if_sid>
9 <extra_data>1</extra_data>
10 <description>Level 1</description>
11 </rule>
12 <!-- Alert for level 2 -->
13 <rule id="109002" level="2">
14 <if_sid>109000</if_sid>
15 <extra_data>2</extra_data>
16 <description>Level 2</description>
17 </rule>
18 ...
19 <!-- follow for levels 3 to 15 -->
20 ...
21 </group>
A parent group is established to hold all related rules. As a “catch-all” bucket,
if a log is decoded as the experiment format, it is first flagged to match rule 109000.
This initial match immediately eliminates all other rule formats except those with a
corresponding if sid element. The if sid field requires a rule to be flagged as another
rule first, in this case rule ID 109000. Additional rule-level combinations can be
included for increasing level values. This way, the system can efficiently emulate rule
threat level promotion or demotion depending on the context of the actual log.
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For example, Figure 14 shows OSSEC’s log-test output, a testing/verification tool
that decodes exactly how the real ossec-analysisd process does. This illustrates three
phases when decoding the sample log:
Jan 11 15:20:17 ossec logger: EXPERIMENT1: an event occurred. LEVEL=14 ID=1
Figure 14. Decoding phases for sample log entry
• Phase 1: The text is recognized as a generic syslog entry, which follows
this format: [ <date> <time> <hostname> <program name>: <--log--> ].
Therefore, it first pulls off the hostname and program name fields.
• Phase 2: OSSEC finds the correct decoder for the program’s actual log entry.
In this case, the custom experiment1 decoder is selected due to the regex pre-
match on the text “experiment1”. This decoder also recognizes the content of
the two other fields, extra data (the visible place-holder for the alert level), and
id (Log ID, not Alert ID).
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• Phase 3: A rule assignment is the last step. OSSEC searches the XML tree,
and can match on rule 109014 as the following elements were true:
<decoded_as> = experiment1 and <extra_data> = 14
Addtionally, this rule ID has a threat severity level of 14, matching the log-test
output in Figure 14.
3.4.3 Active Response.
Active response is technically separated into two elements within the OSSEC
system: commands and configuration. A command simply provides a symbolic link
to the actual executable and can specify expected parameters for a given script. This
experiment defines the SDN-response command in /var/ossec/etc/ossec.conf on the
OSSEC server:
1 <command>
2 <name>SDN-response</name>
3 <executable>SDN-response.sh</executable>
4 <expect></expect>
5 </command>
While the executable does expect the alert level value (extracted as extra data
during decoding), the expect tags are left empty here because the only valid options
are srcip and username. The SDN-response script can still pull the value through the
default parameters forwarded, as shown in the Section 3.4.4.
However, the command alone is not enough to define an active response. In the
configuration (Appendix C), the commands are binded to events defined within their
own active-response element as shown:
1 <active-response>
2 <command>SDN-response</command>
3 <location>server</location>
4 <rules_group>experiment1</rules_group>
5 </active-response>
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The command is used to link the response to the executable’s symbolic link above.
Location is where the command should be executed (alerts can be designed to trig-
ger executables residing on either the server or the agents themselves). Lastly, the
rules group is essential, as any alert generated from this rules group will execute the
response. The experiment has all rules defined under the experiment1 group in the
rules.xml described in Section 3.4.2; thus, the single group identifier can be referenced
here.
3.4.4 SDN Response.
The active response scripts utilize the RESTful interface to the SDN controller in
order to request changes to the network. The essential core curl command format in
the scripts is:
1 curl -X POST -d ’{
2 "switch": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01",
3 "name":"flow-mod-1",
4 "cookie":"0",
5 "priority":"1",
6 "eth_type":"0x0800",
7 "in_port":"1",
8 "active":"true",
9 "actions":"output=2"
10 }’
11 http://10.231.0.10:8080/wm/staticflowpusher/json
This constructs a JSON string, and sends it to the controller (at IP=10.231.0.10
in this experiment) on the port where its REST services are running (8080) via
HTTP POST. This particular request is sent to the StaticFlowEntryPusher module,
which allows a user to manually insert proactive flows and groups into an OpenFlow
network. The command above requests a new flow for a particular switch, which
applies to all packets with eth type of 0x0800. This relates to the two-octet EtherType
field in an Ethernet frame, of which 0x0800 defines IPv4. In summary, this request
generates a new flow on the switch with a Media Access Control (MAC) address of
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[00:00:00:00:00:00:01], directing all IPv4 traffic coming into port 1 to output on port
2. The full SDN-response.sh script is included in Appendix F.
Normally, switches must request how to handle new traffic via a PACKET_IN Open-
Flow message sent to the controller – but as a proactive flow, no additional requests
are required to handle subsequent traffic that matches this flow.
3.4.5 Database.
OSSEC database output is enabled with a make command during OSSEC server
compiling and installation. The database is managed through the ossec-dbd process
on the server, which inserts logs, agent and server information into a MySQL database
on the same machine. This schema’s Enhanced Entity Relationship (EER) diagram
is shown in Figure 15, illustrating the system properties and relationships.
Notable mentions in the EER diagram include:
• The alert table includes the rule id associated with the alert.
• The alert table contains foreign keys to the location where the log originated,
as well as the server ID handling the alert.
• Timestamps upon entry addition are included, which can be used to validate
OSSEC processing when comparing to the log generation timestamp.
3.5 Security
AHNSR is a privileged system with unique network control, and therefore requires
a strong security design. The attack vectors discussed in Section 2.5.1 reveal how the
STRIDE methodology (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure,
Denial of Service, Elevation of privilege) relate to any Software-Defined Network.
This research helps implement these security properties as follows:
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Figure 15. EER diagram of OSSEC database
• Authentication: All critical systems are fully authenticated by standard PKI
(Public Key Infrastructure) using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption. Pri-
vate keys are generated on the Pica switch, Floodlight, and OSSEC using the
native OpenSSL library, and their self-signed certificates are manually installed
on the corresponding partner systems. The Floodlight controller is configured
to support only trust-based SSL for both its OpenFlow connections and REST
API server. These channels operate independently with separate Java keystores,
so settings in one module do not impact the other (Appendix E). As a result, all
curl requests to Floodlight by OSSEC must include this custom public/private
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key format, and redirected to the secure HTTPS port:
1 curl
2 --cacert /rest-cacert.pem
3 --cert /ossec-selfsigned.crt
4 --key /ossec-selfsigned.key
5 -X POST -d ’{
6 "switch": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01",
7 "name":"flow-mod-1",
8 "cookie":"0",
9 "priority":"1",
10 "eth_type":"0x0800",
11 "in_port":"1",
12 "active":"true",
13 "actions":"output=2"
14 }’
15 https://10.231.0.10:8081/wm/staticflowpusher/json
• Confidentiality: OpenFlow TCP traffic is executed through “out-of-band”
management, meaning a dedicated, isolated management port on each switch
communicates directly to Floodlight, and therefore sniffing is not possible with-
out switch access. Similarly, a dedicated bridge on the server allows OSSEC to
communicate with Floodlight on a dedicated channel. However, by nature of
the authentication mechanisms above, OpenFlow traffic is encrypted via SSL
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and communication to the REST server is
encrypted via HTTPS. Furthermore, OSSEC host log messages are encrypted
using the blowfish algorithm and compressed using zlib, utilizing private keys
installed during initial host configuration.
• Integrity: By default, Floodlight confirms successful connections with switches
using the Openflow 1.4 Hello sequence of HelloElements [49]. OSSEC also at-
tempts to prevent falsification and replay attacks using message counters within
the encrypted payload. All OSSEC configuration files on workstation hosts are
also added to the syscheck real-time monitor list for immediate alerts on alter-
cation.
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• Availability: Floodlight is a robust controller that can maintain 100% uptime
under normal load. Additionally, OSSEC has a real-time statistics module that
learns average message load, and can trigger custom alerts when a threshold
is crossed, possibly indicating a denial of service attack. Therefore, even if a
compromised host attempts to flood OSSEC’s UDP receipt queue on port 1514
with legitimate logs, an active response is configured to block the offending host
if an “Excessive Events” rule fires.
3.6 Complete AHNSR Response Flow
Figure 16 illustrates the complete detailed AHNSR framework, putting together
all the components described in this section. The green line represents the response
flow between and within each component, starting at log generation on the agent.
The new entry is collected by the logcollector daemon and forwarded to the OSSEC
server through the agentd/remoted communication pipeline. OSSEC’s three analysis
phases are included and a matching rule results in both database archival and ex-
ecuting the SDN-response.sh script. This queries Floodlight’s REST API, invoking
services published by its Java modules applications. These modules interact with the
core internal services responsible for OpenFlow communication to the switches. The
request is received by the switch resulting in the successful flow table update.
3.7 Design Summary
This chapter describes the individual components of the AHNSR system. The
design is an advanced approach to automate network reconfiguration in reaction to
security policy violations at user workstations.
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Figure 16. Response flow through agent, OSSEC, Floodlight, and switch
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IV. Methodology
4.1 Problem/Objective
This research seeks to expand on Todd’s Dynamic Security Control System (DSCS),
a process of utilizing SDN with host-based security alerts [6]. The limitations of
Todd’s work in this area have been quantified, and this research seeks to mitigate
shortcomings and expand functionality in the following ways:
Limitation Mitigations
• The use of Floodlight’s stateless firewall could not interrupt active connections
if they were found to be malicious. This research seeks a viable solution.
• The DSCS system was not interfaced with an actual IDS. This research seeks
to use industry standard software (OSSEC) and its APIs to generate alerts.
Improvements
• A database schema is incorporated to allow alert sharing and archival tracking,
meeting standard logging policy requirements and improving scalability.
• Different approaches to intrusion response (firewall or access control list up-
dates, first hop modifications, honeypot redirection, etc.) are allowed for more
dynamic control.
• The AMQP publisher/broker model can be replaced with a similar messaging
design within a Security Incident Management (SIM) or Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM) product.
• The programmability of the AMQP protocol can be replicated in a SDN en-
vironment because routing decisions are defined outside the network layer of
packet forwarding devices.
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After redesigning the process, this research introduces Active Host-based Net-
work Security Response (AHNSR), which implements the functionalities listed above.
Therefore, this experiment functions more as an evaluation, testing how the AHNSR
system performs under both normal and stressed loads. The evaluation results will
help inform administrators of optimal configuration settings and set a quantifiable
upper limit for how many agents they can support. As an overall efficiency standard
objective of maintaining a less than 2 second delay in responding to new log entries,
the limit can be determined in statistical trends as network load increases.
4.2 System Under Test
Figure 17 displays the System Under Test (SUT) and Component Under Test
(CUT) diagrams. The workload factors consist of SDN response method and an Event
Per Second (EPS) level, described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 discusses the computing
parameters, which are held constant. The targeted components consist of the agents’
log collection, OSSEC’s analysis/execution performance, active response script, and
Floodlight’s REST API. Recorded metrics, described in Section 4.3, consist of Central
Processing Unit (CPU) utilization, response time, and the percentage of successful
alerts generated.
Agents and servers are segmented on a SuperMicro SuperServer X9QR7-TF+
with 16 Xeon E5-4610 v2 processors, eight 1000BASE-T network interface cards, and
512GB of RAM. Figure 18 shows how the server (labeled as Aberdeen2) contains the
following guest Virtual Machine (VM)s: Linux Ubuntu 14.04 guests are assigned two
cores, 8GB of RAM, and run the OSSEC Agent process to register and connect as
agents to the OSSEC server. Floodlight runs on a XUbuntu virtual machine with
8GB RAM and is assigned two processors. The OSSEC server runs on Ubuntu 14.04
64-bit Server (Linux 4.2.0-27), also with 8GB RAM and is assigned two processors.
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Figure 17. System Under Test (SUT) and Component Under Test (CUT)
All guests have shared access to 1000BASE-T Network Interface Card (NIC)s on a
dedicated virtual bridge and all traffic is switched through a PICA manufactured
switch. The PICA switch is a P3290 model, updated with the latest PicOS (2.7.1)
with OpenFlow 1.4 support. The Floodlight controller utilizes out-of-band man-
agement to the PICA switch on an independent subnet (10.231.255.255), essentially
providing a dedicated OpenFlow channel.
4.2.1 Assumptions.
The following assumptions are understood when designing and executing experi-
ments for the AHNSR system:
1. The framework is dependent on well-configured host auditing and logging poli-
cies, as well as appropriate rule definitions on the management server.
2. Triggers and definitions are limited by the features provided by OSSEC version
2.9 RC3. More specifically, alert triggers are limited to system log analysis,
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Figure 18. Advanced network diagram between server and switch
application log analysis, connection status, rootkit signature detection, selective
registry changes, and/or selective file changes.
3. Rule definitions are limited to the following: alert level, specific rule ID, event
frequency, maximum size, time frame, category, source IP, destination IP, user-
name, hostname, program name, URL, and/or matching regex parameters.
4. The Floodlight controller has out-of-band management to all switches in the
network. If this is not true, it does not ensure dedicated OpenFlow channels
that may become congested otherwise, which can invalidate the observed results.
5. All switches must support OpenFlow 1.3 or higher, as some response modules
require features in these versions.
6. A pre-configured flow is utilized for proactive forwarding to the IDS server.
This is important for the UDP log message forwarding between the agents and
server.
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7. The OSSEC server can connect to Floodlight through a physical or virtual
bridge. This research uses virtual switching with VMware’s ESXi hypervisor.
4.3 Metrics
The stated system objectives are the primary influence in determining suitable
performance metrics. As such, there are three main questions that help consider the
overall performance of the AHNSR system in any given state. In relation to each
question, a metric (or response variable) is adopted for experimentation:
1. As workload increases, are any new logs failing to be processed?
Metric - Alerts Generated (AG): Since the incoming logs are controlled,
and each log should generate an alert, the AG metric can accurately measure
if any logs were not processed. The AG metric can be expressed as the simple
ratio measurement
AG =
SR
LG
(1)
where LG represents the number of logs generated and SR represents the number
of successful responses registered by the AHNSR system.
2. How long does it take for AHNSR to reconfigure the network through flow table
updates?
Metric - Response Time (RT): The time from event generation to flow
table update. RT requires high resolution timing, and its specific measurement
implementation is discussed in further detail in Section 4.6.5.
3. How much CPU utilization on the main server components (OSSEC and Flood-
light) is occurring during a given workload?
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Metric - Central Processing Unit (CPU): Both servers allow the user to
query the system monitoring services to retrieve and log current CPU utilization
information. CPU utilization is measured using the Linux mpstat package,
which provides reports on the global average activities among all processors [50].
Both OSSEC and Floodlight execute # mpstat 1 10 upon each experiment’s
starting trigger, which provide ten reports at one second intervals of the system’s
combined user and system level utilization. Thus, the utilization metric can be
expressed as
CPU = 100−%idle (2)
where %idle is the percentage of time when the CPUs are idle and the system
does not have an outstanding disk I/O request.
Table 1 defines each metric’s units of measurement, accepted range value, and
expected range value.
Table 1. Performance metrics
Metric Units Accepted Range Expected Value
AG (Alerts Generated) numeric
0 to n,
n = # logs generated
n
RT (Response Time) µs 0 to ∞ < 2 x 106 µs
CPU utilization % 0 to 100 Servers: < 80%
4.4 Experiment Factors
Table 2 describes the experiment factors that are considered while developing the
AHNSR framework.
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Table 2. Experiment factors
Factor Type Description
Event density continuous
How many Events Per
Second (EPS) are being
generated
Log-Only active response
status
binary
Status of log only active
response on server
(running/not running)
Firewall active response
status
binary
Status of firewall active
response on server
(running/not running)
Access Control List active
response status
binary
Status of access control list
active response on server
(running/not running)
Static Flow Entry active
response status
binary
Status of static flow entry
active response on server
(running/not running)
Event density is the primary factor, and is the main treatment in the experiment.
The binary parameters consist of the four main SDN response methods available by
Floodlight. Each method helps meet specific data security compliance requirements,
such as those outlined in PCI DSS 2/3.2 [10]. Additionally, the Access Control
List/Static Flow/Firewall modules are all capable of denying network access, which
is the principal incident response strategy for any intrusion. Therefore, this research
includes them as test factors to evaluate the most efficient and effective active re-
sponse method. Treatments described in Section 4.6 allow for any covariance analysis
described in Section 4.7.
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4.5 Experiment Parameters
Many computing parameters are held constant based on the experiment configura-
tion. This includes the component operating systems, resources (memory, CPU, and
disk space), script languages, and switch hardware. The networking configuration
established in the ESXi hypervisor remains constant as well. The tests run with the
same 10 agents (also with identical computing parameters) connected and registered
to the OSSEC manager.
Additionally, file integrity checking and rootkit detection are sub-functions pro-
vided by OSSEC (as discussed in Section 2.7), which may increase noise, latency,
and/or CPU utilization on the agents. Therefore, this research holds those pro-
cesses to a constant running state, helping evaluate for a worst-case scenario when
all OSSEC-provided processes are demanded to run with a heavy workload.
4.6 Experimental Design
4.6.1 Expected Load Level.
Log generation is the most significant contributer to system load, as each log must
process through the OSSEC workflow. In estimating average log generation, Solar-
winds describes a sample enterprise as 1000 employee endpoints, 10 switches/routers,
25 various servers, 4 firewalls, and 7 IPS/IDS [51]. Their estimate for this environ-
ment is a total of 363 EPS. Compensating for potential peak periods and configuration
variety, this research suggests an expected load of 500 EPS under normal operating
conditions for an average enterprise network.
It is also important to note the difference between basic alerts and “SDN Response
Demanding” alerts. Basic alerts are logs ignored or acted on without interaction with
the SDN controller. “SDN Response Demanding” alerts occur when OSSEC receives
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a log and determines it is important enough to request a network modification to the
SDN controller. Because threshold levels, enterprise needs, and SDN incorporation
all vary significantly, the experiment eliminates any gross estimations by assuming
all logs are “SDN Response Demanding”.
4.6.2 Treatments.
The planned experiment treatments are enumerated in Table 3. The columns
represent each of the three factors discussed earlier. Tests 1–4 evaluate the expected
operational load level whereas Tests 5–32 evaluate performance under extra load.
Before starting treatment tests, measurements are taken at a baseline control level
to gather data without external influence involved. This allows a relative level for
output metrics, especially the CPU utilization at a restful state.
Tests 5–32 provide data for evaluation against the alert density parameter. Group-
ing between [5–11], [12–18], [19–25], and [26–32] capture the effect of different active
response methods at increasing density levels. Tests 1–4 also capture these effects at
the expected normal operating load.
4.6.3 Testing Process.
Syslog events are simulated on the agents using a custom decoder and a consoli-
dated, monitored log file. Individual log threat levels are randomized when generated,
and processed through the AHNSR system accordingly. OSSEC’s MySQL database
keeps records of all non-ignored alerts, and active connection termination is enabled
through the manual StaticFlowEntry module. Timing processes are built into the
experiment at the agent (beginning), OSSEC server (middle), and Floodlight (end)
to provide automated, high resolution data of the primary response variable, RT.
Experiments are synchronously initialized using scripts across all agents.
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Table 3. Treatments
Test #
Events Per
Second
(EPS)
Levels
Log-Only Firewall
Access
Control
List
Static
Flow
Entry
(control) 0 off off off off
1 500 on off off off
2 500 off on off off
3 500 off off on off
4 500 off off off on
5-11
10, 100, 1000,
2500, 5000,
7500, 10000
on off off off
12-18
10, 100, 1000,
2500, 5000,
7500, 10000
off on off off
19-25
10, 100, 1000,
2500, 5000,
7500, 10000
off off on off
26-32
10, 100, 1000,
2500, 5000,
7500, 10000
off off off on
All experiments follow an identical testing process using automated scripts where
noted:
1. First, Floodlight is restarted. This clears out all flows, establishes a baseline
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) environment, and ensures connectivity with the
OpenFlow enabled switch.
2. The OSSEC server is restarted, resetting its statistics modules. An additional
reset script forces the server to clear its alert and active response logs.
3. The management start-experiment.sh script (Appendix B) is executed with
arguments that specify the test configuration (e.g., event density, response
method, number of trials, and number of agents). This script automatically
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calls and manages the following steps (4 through 10).
4. An agent configuration bash script (startLogger.sh) is passed to all agents via
listening Ncat sockets. Agents listen using # ncat -l -k 12346 > listen.sh
and the management VM pushes the configuration using
# ncat 192.168.0.1XX 12346 < clientCommand.sh where clientCommand.sh
contains a call to the local log generation script with an EPS parameter.
5. The management VM pings all servers and agents to establish temporary flow
entries. This ensures proactive forwarding and a better synchronized start time
for the networked trigger activation.
6. The experiment is triggered from the management VM via Ncat listeners on the
OSSEC server and agents. Similar to step 4, agents have persistent listeners
as # ncat -l -k 12345 --sh-exec "./listen.sh" – Ncat’s sh-exec tag runs
a command by passing a string to a system shell [52]. The management VM
simply connects to all simultaneously by forking each as a background process:
# ncat 192.168.0.1XX 12345 &
7. Once triggered, the agents begin generating the appropriate amount of logs
using the log generation script (Appendix A).
8. After the experiment completes, the management VM collects the OSSEC alert
and active response logs via Secure Copy (SCP).
9. Data is parsed and validated against the OSSEC database using dataParser.java
(Appendix G).
10. A consolidated data file in Comma Separated Values (CSV) format is pushed
to the results repository using drive, a terminal push/pull style Google Drive
client [53].
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4.6.4 Repeated Measures.
Each EPS level is equivalent to the aggregate log amount generated from all agents.
For example, the 500 EPS level is the result of a 50 logs entered on 10 disparate
agents. A two sample power t-test determines the appropriate number of samples
(in aggregate) to collect in achieving a 95% confidence interval within +−.02 seconds.
Using the highest standard deviation recorded during preliminary testing, .3667, the
power test suggests collecting 7065 samples (Appendix I). With this information, the
experiment designs an appropriate number of additional trials for each test, denoted
in Table 4.
Table 4. Repeated measures to meet minimum 7065 power sample size
Test # EPS Level Trials Total Samples
5,12,19,26 10 707 7070
6,13,20,27 100 71 7100
1,2,3,4 500 15 7500
7,14,21,28 1000 8 8000
8,15,22,29 2500 3 7500
9,16,23,30 5000 2 10000
10,17,24,31 7500 1 7500
11,18,25,32 10000 1 10000
4.6.5 Timing.
It is important to have accurate and high-resolution timing measurements in this
experiment because Response Time (RT) is the primary response variable. Therefore,
Figure 19 illustrates the timestamping workflow developed to record the response
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time for each new log. The QueryPerformanceCounter function is a kernel-level
operation that records a high resolution (< 1 µs) timestamp [54] – these can then
be used for time-interval measurements as the alert processes through the predefined
AHNSR workflow. Lastly, the SDN controller is responsible for recording the end
timestamp. This is accomplished using the native Linux command # date +%s.%N,
which records the number of seconds since the UNIX epoch began, along with the
nanosecond portion of the current system time.
Figure 19. Log and alert timestamping through the AHSNR system
Additionally, VMtools has an option for virtual machines to sync with the ESXi
server they are running on. The ESXi server includes Network Time Protocol (NTP)
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software and starts the ntpd service by default [55]. With all VM hosts connecting to
the ESXi NTP server, system time synchronization can occur. Both the beginning
and end timestamps can be compared against the MySQL timestamp artifact in the
“middle” of the process, which guarantees the validity of the other timestamps.
4.7 Statistical Analysis
A sample experiment, with n EPS, produces two data files for analysis: one
RT-data.csv and one CPU-data.csv. Figures 20 and 21 display a sample portion of
this data from a preliminary experiment with 500 EPS. All information necessary
for metric parsing and analysis is recorded in these files (such as timestamps, trial
numbers, mpstat output, etc.). Additional information, such as the individual alert
id and level (per agent), is also captured during database retrieval for potential trend
analysis. The maximum row index value also accounts for the AG metric, and should
be equal to eps× number of trials for a 100% success rate in a single experiment.
Figure 20. Sample RT-data.csv file
Figure 21. Sample CPU-data.csv file
After collecting data, a statistical analysis is performed using R, a GNU project
language for statistical computing. First, the Response Time (RT) data are tested
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for mean validity using a one-sample t-test, and computing the standard deviation,
mean, and 95% confidence interval.
The comparisons between the baseline control (Events Per Second = 0) and a
particular treatment consists of paired t-tests or Welch-based t-tests. If pilot tests
produce significant degrees of freedom above the necessary statistical power, then the
paired t-tests are more appropriate. However, if additional runs are required for some
but not all treatments, then the corresponding analysis uses the Welch t-test, which
is more appropriate when sample sizes are very different.
A “full” general linear model is developed using all factors, and analyzed using
R to identify significant and insignificant factors. This leads to a reduced model,
which can be compared against the full model using Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA)
techniques.
Due to performance metrics that may be related (e.g., CPU utilization increasing
may affect overall network latency), an analysis of covariance general linear model is
carried out against the experiment data.
4.8 Methodology Summary
This chapter describes the experimentation methodology used to measure the
efficiency (CPU utilization) and effectiveness (Response Time and Alerts Generated)
of the AHNSR system. The treatments use varying workload levels to determine the
operational capacity of the system.
Experimental pilot tests reveal an average of 0.63675 seconds from log generation
to flow table update. The test environment follows the configuration described, in-
cluding two hosts, one OSSEC server, one Floodlight SDN controller, and one PICA
P3290 switch.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Overview
This section describes the results obtained using the AHNSR design during the
experiment structure described in Chapter 4. Section 5.2 describes initial observations
of log collection and gives interpretative insight of the behavior. Analysis of Tests
1–4 are reported in Section 5.3, while the extra load testing (Tests 5–32) is reported
in Section 5.4. Lastly, Section 5.5 describes how R is used to develop performance
models of Response Time (RT) that fit the collected data. Interpretative discussion
includes examples of how these models give insight into any given instance of the
AHNSR framework.
5.2 OSSEC Log Collection Behavior
While conducting initial tests of OSSEC performance and behavior, the resulting
response times were not following expected trends. As OSSEC advertises real-time
monitoring of any host log files, this research expected each log entry to be forwarded
immediately to the OSSEC server and continue down the OSSEC log pipeline de-
scribed in Section 3.4. Therefore, each individual log event would result in very
similar, or near constant response time under normal load.
However, preliminary tests reveal something different. Figure 22 shows the indi-
vidual alert response times of 250 log entries entered into a single host’s syslog file,
following the experimental design setup described in Chapter 3. The scatter-plot
displays non-constant response times, and also presents a significant “jump” around
alert ID 160.
After scaling the tests to multiple hosts, this pattern continues. Figure 23 displays
a similar preliminary test on 10 different hosts simultaneously (Agent IDs Agent 101
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Figure 22. Individual alert response time from 250 logs collected on one host
to Agent 110). By following the data-points of each agent’s logs, the same pattern
emerges: sequentially decreasing times, followed by an approximate 1 second sudden
response time increase.
Figure 23. Individual alert response time from 250 logs per host, from 10 hosts
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Upon further investigation, the source code of logcollector.c, a global variable
exposes the truth that its daemon is not actually forwarding the logs real-time, but is
instead executing inside a while loop defined by a loop timeout variable. Furthermore,
an internal OSSEC options configuration file has a logcollector.loop timeout property
set to one, its minimum accepted value (Appendix D). Documentation states the
property units are in seconds – this suggests any new logs are collected after every 1
second timeout, which can help explain the trends in Figure 22.
Figure 24 helps illustrate the entire process in detail. A sample experiment begins
logging entries from a relative time point of zero. The agent’s logcollector daemon has
been running continually, and its current timeout happens to expire at time=0.35s,
at which point it immediately checks the monitored syslog file, sees the 3 new log
entries, and forwards them to the server for processing. In calculating the response
time for these 3 logs, the difference between the singular check time (0.35) and the
naturally increasing insertion times results in decreasing values (.25 → .15 → .05).
After collecting those logs, the daemon re-enters a one second timeout, checking
the log again at time=1.35s. At this point, it collects the new entries 4-13, again
forwarding them for processing. Similarly, the calculated response times result in a
sequentially decreasing trend, and with all the response times plotted against their
Alert ID, the graph in Figure 24 mirrors the actual results seen in Figures 22 and 23.
The slight differences in sequential alerts is the sum of both write and read op-
erations: the actual write time of logs to the syslog file, in addition to the first-in,
first-out (FIFO) processing times during the checks. This gives the most advantageous
response times to those logs inserted most recent to the point of log collection.
Preliminary results in Figure 23 also show how the agents’ logcollector daemons are
not synchronized together, as the offsets of each 1 second timeout result in offsets of
the recorded response times. Their timeout sessions operate independently, yet given
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Figure 24. Sample log collection behavior with a 1 second timeout loop
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enough data (discussed in Section 4.7), statistically significant conclusions can still
be made about the system behavior. After understanding the log collection behavior,
it is apparent the recorded response time performance should still converge on a
statistical mean with <1s confidence interval, despite the implicit range of varying
timeout offsets.
5.3 Performance Under Expected Load
This section analyzes AHNSR performance results under the suggested normal
operating load of 500 EPS (discussed in Section 4.6).
Table 5 summarizes the results of Tests 1–4, which individually test the SDN
Response factors at the given operational load level. All responses provide 100%
successful alert generation. Both CPU utilization and Response Time vary among
the tests – the proceeding analysis determines the significance of each.
Table 5. AHNSR performance results under 500 EPS load, 10 active agents
Test # Response AG(%) CPU(%) Mean RT(s) σ σx̄ 95% C.I.(s)
(control) N/A N/A 0.20 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 Log-Only 100 9.22 0.5210 0.2860 0.0040 +−0.0079
2 Static Flow 100 34.45 0.5639 0.2779 0.0039 +−0.0077
3 ACL 100 28.52 0.5438 0.2825 0.0040 +−0.0078
4 Firewall 100 31.88 0.5711 0.2934 0.0041 +−0.0081
5.3.1 Expected Load: Response Time.
Figure 25 displays the spread of all RT data for Tests 1–4 (individual trials shown
in Appendix K). The ranges correlate with the behavior expected in the log collection
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workflow; however slight differences are visible, especially with the dispersion of the
upper quartile in the Firewall test.
Figure 25. RT quartile ranges from 15 trials, 500 EPS, 10 active agents
The R script in Appendix I produces Figure 26, which is a plot of resultant
confidence intervals on the means based on the calculations of standard deviation,
standard error of the mean, and a confidence interval (default 95%). The analysis
continues by conducting other statistical methods for further insight.
A one-way repeated measures ANalysis Of VAriance (ANOVA) test provides an
F-statistic of 30.189 and a p-value < 2.2e−16. Therefore, this research clearly rejects
the null hypothesis of equal means for all four response types at the 500 EPS event
density. The ANOVA test only answers the question of whether or not there are
significant differences in the response time means. However, it does not provide us
with any information about how they differ. The analysis must conduct a pairwise
t-test to collect this information.
The pairwise t-tests use the Holm adjustment method to correct the Type I error
rate across the tests. Mathematically, the Holm adjustment sequentially compares
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Figure 26. C.I. on the RT mean from 15 trials of 500 EPS, 10 active agents
the lowest p-value with a Type I error rate that is reduced for each consecutive test.
The Holm method is generally considered superior to the Bonferroni adjustment, yet
still maintains a mathematically conservative approach [56]. The test outputs the
following:
ACL Firewall Log-Only
Firewall 6.8× 10−6 - -
Log-Only 0.00019 < 2× 10−16 -
Static Flow 0.00084 0.20737 2.6× 10−13
Using an alpha level of .05 threshold, the pairwise t-test results indicate that
there is a statistically significant difference between almost all responses, excluding
that between static flow and firewall (p = .20737 > α). Therefore, the analysis of
Tests 1–4 can develop the following statistical conclusions:
1. At this load level (500 EPS), the Log response is faster than all other tested
responses.
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2. At this load level (500 EPS), the ACL response is faster than the Firewall and
Static Flow response.
5.3.2 Expected Load: CPU.
CPU data is measured using the Linux mpstat package, and Figure 27 displays
the spread of CPU data for each SDN response at the tested level, 500 EPS. The
data only includes a single measurement captured during the first second after the
experiment begins, because RT measurements show the active response completing
within one second on average. Therefore the tests only capture CPU utilization
directly involved in active response pre-processing. Any measurements below or equal
to the control threshold (≤ 0.20% – from “control” test in Table 5) would represent
behavior equivalent to the system at an idle state (reduction seen in Appendix L).
The repeated measures design provides additional data for the CPU metric by having
multiple trials with every SDN response type, as discussed in Section 4.6.4.
While there are technically two servers with CPU resources (OSSEC and Flood-
light), only the mean CPU utilization of the OSSEC server is reported on Table 5
because it is the primary consumer. Both servers’ data are visible in Figure 27. The
ranges for the CPU metric on the OSSEC server are higher in comparison to the
counterpart Floodlight utilization during and given SDN response type test. It fol-
lows logically that the utilization range on the Floodlight server during the Log-Only
test results in a narrow range near zero. The Log-Only response does not demand any
immediate work from the specialized modules provided by Floodlight, so one would
expect to see a minimal amount of processor cycles used.
Likewise with the RT data, the analysis proceeds to extrapolate the standard
deviation and standard error of the measurements in order to build a 95% confidence
interval on the mean utilization for each server-response pair. Figure 28 displays these
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results vertically stacked on each SDN response.
Figure 27. OSSEC and Floodlight CPU quartile ranges, 15 trials at 500 EPS
Figure 28. C.I. on the Floodlight and OSSEC CPU mean, 15 trials of 500 EPS
An ANOVA test on each set of the CPU data from OSSEC and Floodlight pro-
duces F statistics of 105.98 and 11.7373 respectively. This guarantees that the means
are not all equal across the SDN type subsets. Furthermore, a Holm-adjusted pairwise
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t-test for the CPU utilization between the responses on the OSSEC server outputs
the following:
ACL Firewall Log-Only
Firewall 6.1× 10−5 - -
Log-Only 6.6× 10−13 < 2× 10−16 -
Static Flow 0.014 0.049 1.1× 10−15
Similarly, a Holm-adjusted pairwise t-test for the CPU utilization between the
responses on the Floodlight server outputs the following:
ACL Firewall Log-Only
Firewall 1.0 - -
Log-Only 0.00036 0.00012 -
Static Flow 1.0 1.0 5.6× 10−5
Using the same alpha threshold of .05, the analysis can come to the following
statistical conclusions:
1. There are significant differences in the CPU means between all SDN response
methods on the OSSEC server.
2. There is only a significant difference in the CPU mean for the Log-Only response
method on the Floodlight server.
This research considers the net sum of all resources from both servers when de-
termining the most efficient response method. Therefore, the evaluation of Tests 1–4
orders the response methods from best to worst in terms of CPU resource efficiency:
Log-Only, ACL, Static Flow, and Firewall.
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5.4 Load Testing
In order to gather insight on AHNSR performance under non-standard load levels
(e.g., peak periods), Tests 5–32 measure how it responds under increasing event den-
sity levels. The summary of these results are shown in Tables 6 through 9. General
observations from the summary data can be formulated:
• Every EPS level resulted in 100% successful alert generation.
• There is a trend of increasing CPU as EPS increases.
• There is a trend of increasing RT as EPS increases.
Each EPS level is equivalent to the aggregate log amount generated from all agents.
For example, the 100 EPS level is the result of a 10 logs entered on 10 disparate agents.
With this design, and considering the growing sample size for subsequent tests, the
tests set a sample size baseline equal to the power test calculated in Section 4.6.4
(n ≥ 7065). Therefore, all EPS levels except 7500 and 10000 require repeated trials
in a repeated measures design to meet the minimum sample size for analysis.
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Table 6. Log-Only response load testing results
Test # EPS AG(%) CPU(%) Mean RT(s) σ σx̄ 95% C.I.(s)
(control) 0 N/A 0.20 N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 10 100 0.31 0.4941 0.2935 0.02075 +−0.0409
6 100 100 2.06 0.4812 0.2867 0.0064 +−0.0274
7 1000 100 13.4 0.5134 0.2640 0.0026 +−0.0176
8 2500 100 27.99 0.5415 0.2883 0.0057 +−0.0113
9 5000 100 60.15 0.7623 0.3259 0.0046 +−0.0090
10 7500 100 60.84 1.0396 0.4334 0.0050 +−0.0098
11 10000 100 61.06 1.1514 0.4892 0.0048 +−0.0095
Table 7. ACL response load testing results
Test # EPS AG(%) CPU(%) Mean RT(s) σ σx̄ 95% C.I.(s)
(control) 0 N/A 0.20 N/A N/A N/A N/A
12 10 100 0.56 0.5174 0.2872 0.0064 +−0.0125
13 100 100 3.83 0.5599 0.2872 0.0064 +−0.0253
14 1000 100 44.34 0.7050 0.3131 0.0031 +−0.0221
15 2500 100 76.49 1.1243 0.4027 0.0080 +−0.0157
16 5000 100 80.06 2.0061 0.7462 0.0105 +−0.0206
17 7500 100 78.63 2.4270 0.9210 0.0106 +−0.0208
18 10000 100 79.62 3.2080 1.1990 0.0119 +−0.0235
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Table 8. Firewall response load testing results
Test # EPS AG(%) CPU(%) Mean RT(s) σ σx̄ 95% C.I.(s)
(control) 0 N/A 0.20 N/A N/A N/A N/A
19 10 100 0.72 0.5206 0.2800 0.0197 +−0.0390
20 100 100 4.51 0.5209 0.2942 0.0065 +−0.0261
21 1000 100 55.73 0.9120 0.3394 0.0107 +−0.0113
22 2500 100 80.94 1.3112 0.6265 0.0056 +−0.0210
23 5000 100 85.49 2.8844 1.1538 0.0163 +−0.0319
24 7500 100 87.13 5.2275 2.1906 0.0254 +−0.0499
25 10000 100 87.39 5.8603 2.2177 0.0222 +−0.0435
Table 9. Static Flow response load testing results
Test # EPS AG(%) CPU(%) Mean RT(s) σ σx̄ 95% C.I.(s)
(control) 0 N/A 0.20 N/A N/A N/A N/A
26 10 100 0.66 0.5340 0.2912 0.0291 +−0.0577
27 100 100 4.97 0.5204 0.2868 0.0064 +−0.0175
28 1000 100 53.04 0.5752 0.3573 0.0035 +−0.0172
29 2500 100 69.7 1.3531 0.5025 0.0100 +−0.0249
30 5000 100 75.46 2.4499 1.0372 0.0146 +−0.0287
31 7500 100 75.76 2.7983 1.1034 0.0127 +−0.0249
32 10000 100 76.44 3.7025 1.4978 0.0149 +−0.0293
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5.4.1 AG.
To test these higher-end networking load levels on the servers, modifications to
the Linux kernel networking parameters were necessary. Appendix H details the
tuning changes made on both the OSSEC and Floodlight servers. These modifications
included an internal change to the system file descriptor limit because every open
network socket requires a file descriptor in Linux. Increasing this limit ensures that
lingering TIME WAIT sockets and other consumers of file descriptors do not impact
the ability to handle numerous concurrent requests. Therefore, this limit must be set
above the EPS load level in each test environment because each event subsequently
initiates a TCP connection between OSSEC and Floodlight, creating open network
socket file descriptors.
The results show AHNSR successfully handles every EPS load level with 100%
alert generation. Interestingly, OSSEC’s agent to server communication dependency
on UDP (an implicit potential weakness of OSSEC’s log collection procedure) did
not seem to affect its ability to handle even extreme loads. Granted, the lack of
normal enterprise IP traffic may affect this ability, but it should still maintain at
least a normally observed standard of 98% reliable delivery [57]. Additionally, a single
intrusion would commonly result in several logs (indicative of the threat) forwarded to
the OSSEC server – thus, it could be argued that OSSEC can afford to lose a certain
percentage of those logs if at least one results in the appropriate active response
action.
5.4.2 Load Testing: RT.
Comparing the difference in adjusted start time and response end time for each
alert in the data, this section summarizes and analyze the RT metric from both a
global and per-test perspective. For each EPS level, the mean RT is calculated along
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with its standard deviation, standard error, and resulting 95% confidence interval (R
code in Appendix J).
Figure 29 displays these means for each SDN response at the tested EPS levels. A
small colored ribbon connects the high and low confidence intervals between points.
Interestingly, the seemingly minor, insignificant differences seen at the 500 EPS level
in Tests 1–4 are definitely magnified at increasing loads. For example, the widest
observed gap is 4.67 seconds, occurring between the upper C.I. on the Log-Only
mean RT and the lower C.I. on the Firewall mean RT at the 10000 EPS level. Given
these results, administrators should consider the significant performance hit when
using the Firewall module as an active response, especially if similar results can be
obtained by utilizing the Static Entry or ACL modules.
Figure 29. Mean RT for EPS levels 10 through 10000, 10 active agents
Furthermore, these results can give insight into an appropriate system architecture
based on network needs and load estimation. If a network with similar resources to
this experiment anticipates peak periods of 5000 SDN Response Demanding EPS, and
certain policies state that any automated immediate reaction to any intrusion must
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be, on average, under 2 seconds – these results suggest the limitations would eliminate
the Firewall and Static Flow Entry active responses as acceptable candidates.
5.4.3 Load Testing: CPU.
This section reports and analyzes the average utilization of the AHNSR system’s
CPU resources during load testing. The sample size of this data is much smaller than
that of the RT data, due to interval limitations of mpstat output (as noted in Section
1.6). However, the analyis can still come to conclusions about the effect of EPS on
this metric.
Since some RT measurements are greater than one second, a more accurate picture
of resource utilization includes the entirety of the mpstat output, which collects CPU
information for 10 seconds, when AHNSR work may still be occuring. Therefore,
Figure 30 plots the mean of the CPU measurements for each SDN response at every
EPS level. It follows the order of performance that has been observed in previous tests,
with the Log-Only response maintaining the lowest utilization, Firewall maintaining
highest, and ACL/Static Flow in between.
The collected data seems to follow a logarithmic trend (with the exception of
Log-Only response) that tends to level off at an upper limit for each response. One
explanation for this could be the Linux operating system’s CPU scheduler trying to
meet the needs of both bash execution and network I/O. Resource limits and cycling
between process and I/O bursts can extend the CPU utilization required over multiple
seconds versus what is possible in a single second. Also, testing of the log generation
script suggests that the experiments are reaching the upper limit of how many logs
can be written to the syslog file per second. This would correlate to utilization per
second leveling off as the actual EPS generation rate per second is the same. Once
pass the maximum threshold, it would require multiple seconds to actually generate
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Figure 30. Mean CPU utilization for EPS levels 10 through 10000, 10 active agents
the amount of logs. Further testing confirms this – the log generation script has a
max generation rate near 1000 logs per second. This means testing an aggregate EPS
level above 10000 would require more than ten agents (1000× 10 = 10000).
5.5 RT Performance Models
Using the collected data, R constructs models of AHNSR system performance.
Appendix J details the necessary R code execution in developing a linear model for
each SDN response. Considering the primary response variable, RT, as the output,
Figure 31 plots in blue the mean RT summary data from Tables 6–9. The red line
illustrates the corresponding linear models for each response with a surrounding 95%
confidence interval.
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(a) Log-Only (b) Static Flow Entry
(c) Firewall (d) ACL
Figure 31. Fitting linear models where y = Response Time and x = EPS
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These models represent systems that choose to implement that specific SDN re-
sponse style exclusively. When RT (Response Time) is described as a function of eps
(Events Per Second), the models can be derived as
• Log-Only:
RT = 0.42869 + 0.00007eps (3)
RT[95% lower] = 0.33000 + 0.00005eps (4)
RT[95% upper] = 0.52737 + 0.00009eps (5)
• Static Flow Entry:
RT = 0.46778 + 0.00033eps (6)
RT[95% lower] = 0.07721 + 0.00024eps (7)
RT[95% upper] = 0.85834 + 0.00040eps (8)
• Firewall:
RT = 0.23732 + 0.00059eps (9)
RT[95% lower] = −0.50995 + 0.00045eps (10)
RT[95% upper] = 0.98458 + 0.00072eps (11)
• ACL:
RT = 0.49669 + 0.00027eps (12)
RT[95% lower] = 0.31284 + 0.00025eps (13)
RT[95% upper] = 0.68054 + 0.00030eps (14)
5.5.1 Dynamic Model.
If the AHNSR framework were to use a combination of different responses, R
must construct a model to include all parameters. This is a more flexible model
that allows for a dynamic response policy in real enterprise environments. However,
in order to correctly analyze the data in this fashion, this research cannot interpret
the parameters as binary factors. Instead, they can be considered as continuous,
numeric values representing the percentage of alerts that will be attributed to its
response method. Therefore, the current analysis interprets the conducted tests as
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Table 10 suggests, where each test group is actually the sum of the percentages for
each response method and that specific category maintains 100% alert attribution.
Table 10. Dynamic model interpretation
Test # EPS
Alert Distribution To
Log-Only Firewall ACL Static
5-11
10, 100, 1000,
2500, 5000,
7500, 10000
100% 0% 0% 0%
12-18
10, 100, 1000,
2500, 5000,
7500, 10000
0% 100% 0% 0%
19-25
10, 100, 1000,
2500, 5000,
7500, 10000
0% 0% 100% 0%
26-31
10, 100, 1000,
2500, 5000,
7500, 10000
0% 0% 0% 100%
Because each method is operating with independent active response scripts and
Floodlight modules, this research assumes there will be no dependency issues affecting
the performance metrics when starting to mix the methods in this dynamic model.
This assumption allows the analysis to use the previously collected experimental data
to develop a model and make educated estimates on the mixed scenario described
next.
The derived expression for the average response time (RTavg) in a dynamic model
can be described as
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RTavg = l(0.42869 + 0.00007e) + s(0.46778 + 0.00033e)+
f(0.23732 + 0.00059e) + a(0.49669 + 0.00027e)
(15)
RTavg[95% lower] = l(0.33000 + 0.00005e) + s(0.07721 + 0.00024e)+
f(−0.50995 + 0.00045e) + a(0.31284 + 0.00025e)
(16)
RTavg[95% upper] = l(0.52737 + 0.00009e) + s(0.85834 + 0.00040e)+
f(0.98458 + 0.00072e) + a(0.68054 + 0.00030e)
(17)
where RTavg is described as a function of e (EPS), a (ACL response ratio), f (Firewall
response ratio), l (Log-only response ratio), and s (Static Flow response ratio). This
function assumes (a+ f + l + s) = 1, meaning the distribution ratios sum to 100%.
This consolidated dynamic model can be used where general network traffic statis-
tics are already known. For example, the distribution ratios are populated by taking
a sample network environment with the following estimates (these values are based
upon the immediate active response required on the aggregate log amount in the
AHNSR workflow – thus a brief rationale is included for the estimation in a general-
ized enterprise environment):
1. 80% Log-Only: A traditional enterprise environment can safely assume that
most logs need no further action other than OSSEC logging.
2. 10% ACL: Some suspicious, threatening, or multi authentication-failed logs
may require IP addresses to be put on the access control list temporarily or
permanently.
3. 5% Firewall: Since the firewall is configured relatively static for system control
over ports/services/etc., only extreme cases should create new rules to imple-
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ment enterprise-wide.
4. 5% Static Flow: Special circumstances may require specific, custom flow
responses that can be specific to IP, hostname, username, or other match fields.
With these estimates inserted into the dynamic RT function, the average RT
becomes
RTavg = .8(.42869 + .00007e) + .1(.46778 + .00033e)+
.05(.23732 + .00059e) + .05(.49669 + .00027e)
(18)
Figure 32 is a plot of RTavg for the consolidated dynamic model. Using this
information, administrators can make informed decisions about network design and
scalability requirements. For example, if they desire a near-immediate ( < 1s ) deny-
access response when necessary, then the model suggests an appropriate EPS level.
Given this limit, auditing policies on all workstations can be modified to produce an
average aggregate less than 4000 logs per second (as Figure 32 shows the average RT
near 4000 EPS ≤ 1s). On the other hand, the threshold provides an estimate on the
number of agents that a single AHNSR instance can support.
Lastly, this research seeks to confirm the accuracy of the dynamic model by con-
ducting a single additional experiment with 10 agents each logging 500 EPS, for an
aggregate 5000 EPS. However in this scenario, the active responses are configured to
only respond for specific alert levels.
There are 18 possible alert levels in OSSEC and each log has a single alert level
identifier, discussed in Section 3.4. Therefore, this test’s distribution can mimic the
sample network described above like so:
• Log-Only assigned to alert levels 1 through 14. [14/18 = 77.77% distribution]
• ACL assigned to alert levels 15 and 16. [2/18 = 11.11% distribution]
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Figure 32. RT estimate in 80% Log, 10% ACL, 5% Firewall, 5% Static Flow model
• Firewall assigned to alert level 17. [1/18 = 5.55% distribution]
• Static Flow assigned to alert level 18. [1/18 = 5.55% distribution]
The test yields a mean RT of 1.049 seconds. Figure 33 shows how this data
(represented by the blue X) falls within the 95% confidence interval for the dynamic
model when the EPS Level = 5000, confirming the accuracy of the model.
5.6 Chapter Summary
This section summarizes the results of all evaluation tests. Preliminary results are
discussed with insight on the log collection timeout behavior. Next, it presents data
results of all tests, indicating when there were statistically significant differences in
the RT and CPU performance metrics. The 100% success rate of the AG metric also
indicates dependable use of the OSSEC log collection workflow. Lastly, it compares
the performance between different active response methods and presents performance
models for the RT factor.
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Figure 33. Dynamic model test result
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VI. Conclusion
6.1 Overview
This chapter summarizes the research and statistical conclusions from the exper-
imental evaluation. Section 6.2 reiterates key conclusions drawn from the research.
Section 6.3 discusses experimental significance in the SDN domain. Finally, Section
6.4 suggests potential opportunities for future work with the AHNSR system design.
6.2 Research Conclusions
The research was successful in implementing a viable security solution for SDN
controller action in response to host-based intrusion detection system alerts. As
hypothesized, both the response time for successful completion of an appropriate SDN
response and the processor resource utilization increased as the aggregate number of
logs being generated by hosts (EPS) increased. The alert generation rate remained
above an effectiveness standard of 99% for all tests. Additionally, when comparing the
different response methods, the Access Control List response method did outperform
the Firewall response method in both quantitative and qualitative metrics. These
conclusions support the original hypothesis.
Evaluation tests emulate a traditional enterprise network using OSSEC server/a-
gents deployment, real hardware, and implementation of security options. Security
is not overlooked during AHNSR configuration as it adopts confidentiality, integrity,
and authentication characteristics, building an appropriate defense against attacks
directed towards its internal structure. All OpenFlow and REST API communica-
tion is encrypted via SSL/TLS, and pre-configured certificates allow whitelisting for
higher privilege access of trusted systems.
Tests 1–4 demonstrate a mean active response time near 0.53 seconds, regardless
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of response method, when the system is handling 500 incoming logs per second. Also,
CPU utilization on all components remained below 35%. These metrics illustrate an
efficient and effective integration of OSSEC and Floodlight in the AHNSR design.
Load testing from Tests 5–32 give insight into RT growth rate for each response
method, allowing performance projection as EPS increases. A consolidated model is
also developed for performance estimates in dynamic environments.
6.3 Research Significance
SDN interest is exploding; its market value is forecast to grow at 86% Compound
Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), from being valued at approximately $2 billion in 2015
to $132 billion+ in 2022 [58]. All this publicity about SDN begs the question - is
it realistic? Google says yes. In fact, they have already implemented SDN into the
backbone Wide Area Network (WAN) that connects their data centers all across the
globe. By doing this, they have proven: 1) conversion from a traditional network is
possible; and 2) the results are substantial. Their bandwidth utilization on their new
SDN has been measured at 95%, a huge increase from traditional rates of 30-40% [59]
[60]. As more technological leaders of the Open Networking Foundation continue to
implement and promote SDN, it will become a standard practice in the industry.
As this trend continues, migration of network services must naturally follow with
security as a top priority. Decisions will be made about maintaining a heterogeneous
intrusion detection system (if any) or transitioning to what this research proposes: a
unified SDN security management solution. There are advantages to the unique infor-
mation both systems collect and can be extremely effective when they work together.
Network protection is possible by authorizing a central controller to manage layer 2
devices via the OpenFlow protocol; however, it is imperative to provide the controller
accurate security data, namely from a well-configured HIDS manager. Ideally, the
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privileged controller functionality is abstracted to a secure API, permitting the HIDS
manager to initiate requests based off the present or historical data it already has.
This abstracted version is exactly what the research represents through the AHNSR
system.
6.4 Future Work
There are many possibilities of extending the AHNSR system due to additional
research and/or tools developed in other domains. Incorporation of these tools could
increase performance, scalability, usability, and more. The following suggests four
future work options based off what was encountered while conducting this research:
• First, the limitation of actual “real-time” log collection can be solved by internal
development in the OSSEC agent software. It is possible to modify the process
by utilizing the libevent library, and configuring it to trigger upon new entries
in the same log files monitored by OSSEC. Therefore, it could achieve real
time monitoring based off triggers rather than timeout intervals. Since those
modifications can affect overall performance, more evaluation is necessary to
determine the significance.
• Second, there is more potential in utilizing the historical data stored in the OS-
SEC database. For the entirety OSSEC is running in a network, it is collecting
data on each host’s actions. Login times, syslog, and application interaction all
put together effectively captures an individual’s cyber behavior. One could im-
plement machine learning with this data, taking advantage of the unprocessed
training set naturally developed. Alerts could then be generated off a more
intelligent algorithm rather than simple regex parameters. Trends can be de-
veloped on a per-hostname and/or per-username basis, giving more control and
insight into possible insider threats as well.
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• Third, there is always room for improvement in program execution, manage-
ment, and abstraction. Regarding Floodlight, features are continually being
developed that give users greater flexibility and control over their SDN. The
OpenFlow protocol continues to be updated frequently but adopted in practice
slowly, thereby making it difficult to utilize newer features, even if some of these
may be more efficient/effective in handling appropriate active responses. Cre-
ativity and innovation are supreme though - there are endless possibilities for
finite control over network and transport layer headers at each packet forward-
ing device in networks around the globe.
• Lastly, a different CPU utilization collection technique can be implemented.
This research could not bypass the frequency limitation of per-second reports
using the mpstat command. Another method with sub-second insight may be
more effective in providing a higher sample size of CPU data, consequentially
yielding more accurate results.
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter concludes the background, design, methodology, and results of this
research. It summarizes the overall research conclusions, discusses the significance
of the work, and suggests opportunities for future work in improving the AHNSR
framework.
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Appendix A. Log Generation Script
1 #include <windows.h>
2 #include <iostream >
3 #include <string >
4 #include <fstream >
5 #include <sstream >
6 using namespace std;
7
8 /// Create a Timer , which will immediately begin counting
9 /// up from 0.0 seconds.
10 /// You can call reset() to make it start over.
11 class Timer {
12 public:
13 Timer() {
14 ///GetSystemTimeAsFileTime (& timestart);
15 GetSystemTime (& timestart);
16 reset();
17 }
18 /// reset() makes the timer start over counting from 0.0 seconds.
19 void reset() {
20 unsigned __int64 pf;
21 QueryPerformanceFrequency (( LARGE_INTEGER *)&pf);
22 freq_ = 1.0 / (double)pf;
23 QueryPerformanceCounter (( LARGE_INTEGER *)&baseTime_);
24 }
25 /// seconds () returns the number of seconds (to very high resolution)
26 /// elapsed since the timer was last created or reset().
27 double seconds () {
28 unsigned __int64 val;
29 QueryPerformanceCounter (( LARGE_INTEGER *)&val);
30 return (val - baseTime_) * freq_;
31 }
32 /// seconds () returns the number of milliseconds (to very high resolution)
33 /// elapsed since the timer was last created or reset().
34 double milliseconds () {
35 return seconds () * 1000.0;
36 }
37
38 string getStartTime () {
39 ///ULONGLONG t = (( ULONGLONG)timestart.dwHighDateTime << 32) | (ULONGLONG)
timestart.dwLowDateTime;
40 ///return (double)t / 10000000.0;
41 string toReturn = to_string(timestart.wHour) + ":" + to_string(timestart.wMinute)
+ ":" + to_string(timestart.wSecond) + "." + to_string(timestart.
wMilliseconds);
42 return toReturn;
43 }
44 private:
45 double freq_;
46 unsigned __int64 baseTime_;
47 ///FILETIME timestart;
48 SYSTEMTIME timestart;
49 };
50
51 int main(int argc , char* argv []) {
52
53 //Start Timer to syncronize with server (trigger)
54 Timer myTimer;
55
56 // Validate input
57 if (argc != 3) {
58 // Tell the user how to run the program
59 cerr << "Usage: " << argv [0] << " <EVENTS -PER -SECOND > <SECONDS -TO -RUN >";
60 return 1;
61 }
62 istringstream ss1(argv [1]);
63 int EVENTS_PER_SECOND;
64 if (!(ss1 >> EVENTS_PER_SECOND)) {
65 cerr << "Invalid number: " << argv [1];
66 return 1;
67 }
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68 istringstream ss2(argv [2]);
69 int SECONDS_TO_RUN;
70 if (!(ss2 >> SECONDS_TO_RUN)) {
71 cerr << "Invalid number: " << argv [2];
72 return 1;
73 }
74
75 // Create File handle
76 ofstream outfile;
77
78 //Clear the current log
79 // outfile.open(" experimentlog.txt", ios_base :: trunc);
80 // outfile.close();
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82 // Generate X logs per second for Y seconds , based off input args
83 // closing file after each write so it doesn’t lock control
84 for (int currentSecond = 0; currentSecond < SECONDS_TO_RUN; currentSecond ++) {
85 //If it isn’t the next second yet , then sleep for 10 ms
86 while (myTimer.seconds () < currentSecond) {
87 Sleep (10);
88 }
89 for (int i = 1; i <= EVENTS_PER_SECOND; i++) {
90 outfile.open("experimentlog.txt", ios_base ::app);
91 outfile << "EXPERIMENT1: an event occurred. ";
92 outfile << "LEVEL=1 ";
93 outfile << "ID=";
94 outfile << (currentSecond * EVENTS_PER_SECOND + i); // accumulate event ID over
the entire period
95 outfile << " TIME=" << myTimer.seconds ();
96 outfile << "\n";
97 outfile.close ();
98 // cout << myTimer.seconds ();
99 /// STRINGSTREAM METHOD ??
100 // stringstream tempString;
101 // tempString << "echo EXPERIMENT1: event level 1 generated. IP :192.168.0.102
ID:";
102 // string tempCmd ("echo EXPERIMENT1: event level 1 generated. IP :192.168.0.102
ID:" + i + " >> experimentlog.txt");
103 // system(tempCmd.c_str());
104 }
105 }
106
107 // outfile << "Total Seconds passed: " << myTimer.seconds ();
108 // outfile << "\n";
109 // outfile.close();
110
111 return 0;
112 }
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Appendix B. Experiment Management Script
1 #!/bin/bash
2 #Author Jon Goodgion
3
4 #Check for command line args
5 if [ $# -eq 0 ]
6 then
7 echo "NO ARGUMENTS SUPPLIED. RUN WITH <EXP NAME > <WAIT -TIME > <optional:TRIAL -
NUMBER >"
8 echo "EXP NAME formatted as HOST#-EPS#-customstring (e.g. 10-1- acltest)"
9 exit 1
10 elif [ -z "$1" ]
11 then
12 echo "Need EXP NAME"
13 exit 1
14 elif [ -z "$2" ]
15 then
16 echo "Need Wait time argument"
17 exit 1
18 fi
19
20 if [ -z "$3" ]
21 then
22 trialnumber =1
23 else
24 trialnumber="$3"
25 echo "Executing with $trialnumber trials"
26 fi
27 expname="$1"
28
29 #Setup Java classpath
30 export CLASSPATH =/home/ubuntu/Downloads/mysql -connector -java -5.1.40/ mysql -connector -
java -5.1.40 - bin.jar:$CLASSPATH
31
32 echo " --- Creating client execution script ... ---"
33
34 IFS=’-’ read -r -a array <<< "$expname"
35 EPS="${array [1]}"
36 echo "./ startLogger3.sh $EPS" >> ~/ clientCommand.txt
37
38 sleeptime="$2"
39 echo "SLEEPTIME=$sleeptime seconds"
40 echo "EPS=$EPS"
41
42 #If a firewall experiment , start firewall module and default allow through the pica
switch
43 if [[ $expname == *"firewall"* ]]
44 then
45 echo "Enabling Firewall module and allowing flows through switch 5e:3e:c4
:54:44:4f:2b:ba"
46 curl http :// localhost :8080/ wm/firewall/module/enable/json -X PUT -d ’’
47 curl -X POST -d ’{"switchid": "5e:3e:c4 :54:44:4f:2b:ba"}’ http :// localhost
:8080/ wm/firewall/rules/json
48 else
49 echo "Firewall module is DISABLED"
50 fi
51
52 # BEGIN FOR LOOP (TRIALS)
53 for i in ‘seq 1 $trialnumber ‘;
54 do
55
56 echo "--- Resetting OSSEC server logs ... ---"
57 ncat 10.131.0.11 12344 --idle -timeout 1
58 > /home/ubuntu/cpuUsage.log
59 echo "--- Send experiment execution to clients ---"
60 ncat 192.168.0.101 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
61 ncat 192.168.0.102 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
62 ncat 192.168.0.103 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
63 ncat 192.168.0.104 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
64 ncat 192.168.0.105 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
65 ncat 192.168.0.106 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
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66 ncat 192.168.0.107 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
67 ncat 192.168.0.108 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
68 ncat 192.168.0.109 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
69 ncat 192.168.0.110 12346 --idle -timeout 1 < ~/ clientCommand.txt &
70 wait
71
72 echo "--- Ping priming the hosts ---"
73 #ping all clients to force switch to create necessary temporary forwarding flows (
reducing delay)
74 ping -c 2 192.168.0.3 2>&1 >/dev/null &
75 ping -c 2 192.168.0.101 2>&1 >/dev/null &
76 ping -c 2 192.168.0.102 2>&1 >/dev/null &
77 ping -c 2 192.168.0.103 2>&1 >/dev/null &
78 ping -c 2 192.168.0.104 2>&1 >/dev/null &
79 ping -c 2 192.168.0.105 2>&1 >/dev/null &
80 ping -c 2 192.168.0.106 2>&1 >/dev/null &
81 ping -c 2 192.168.0.107 2>&1 >/dev/null &
82 ping -c 2 192.168.0.108 2>&1 >/dev/null &
83 ping -c 2 192.168.0.109 2>&1 >/dev/null &
84 ping -c 2 192.168.0.110 2>&1 >/dev/null &
85 wait
86
87 #then trigger timestamps/actions to occur simultaneously
88 echo "--- Trigger Experiment Start ---"
89 ncat 192.168.0.101 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
90 ncat 192.168.0.102 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
91 ncat 192.168.0.103 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
92 ncat 192.168.0.104 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
93 ncat 192.168.0.105 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
94 ncat 192.168.0.106 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
95 ncat 192.168.0.107 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
96 ncat 192.168.0.108 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
97 ncat 192.168.0.109 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
98 ncat 192.168.0.110 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
99 ncat 192.168.0.3 12345 --idle -timeout 1 &
100
101 #New version CPU logging
102 mpstat 1 10 | grep -A 10 "%idle" | tail -n 10 | awk -F " " ’{print $1 " " (100-$13)
}’ > /home/ubuntu/cpuUsage.log
103 wait
104 echo "--- Start Triggers complete ---"
105 echo "--- Waiting for $sleeptime seconds ... ---"
106 sleep "$sleeptime"
107
108 echo "--- Gathering Data ... ---"
109 filename="$expname$i"
110 scp root@10 .131.0.11:/ start -times.txt ~/ RESULTS/"$filename"-startTime.txt
111 scp root@10 .131.0.11:/ cpuUsage.log ~/ RESULTS/"$filename"-cpuUsage.txt
112 scp root@10 .131.0.11:/ var/ossec/logs/active -responses.log ~/ RESULTS/"$filename"-
activeResponse.txt
113 scp root@10 .131.0.11:/ var/ossec/logs/archives/archives.log ~/ RESULTS/"$filename"-
rawLogs.txt
114
115 echo "--- Parsing Data ... ---"
116
117 cd ~/ RESULTS
118 if [[ $expname == *"echo"* ]]
119 then
120 echo using ECHO dataParser
121 java dataParser "$expname"
122 else
123 echo using logger dataParser3
124 java dataParser4 "$expname" "$i"
125 fi
126
127 #echo " --- Clearing all flows and ACL entries ... ---"
128 #curl http :// localhost :8080/ wm/acl/clear/json
129 wait
130 curl http :// localhost :8080/ wm/staticentrypusher/clear/all/json
131 echo " "
132
133 done
134 #END FOR LOOP
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135
136 #disable firewall module
137 if [[ $expname == *"firewall"* ]]
138 then
139 echo "Disabling Firewall module ..."
140 curl http :// localhost :8080/ wm/firewall/module/disable/json -X PUT -d ’’
141 fi
142
143
144 echo " --- Pushing to Drive ... ---"
145 cp ~/ RESULTS/"$expname"-cpu -data.csv ~/ gdrive/
146 cp ~/ RESULTS/"$expname"-data.csv ~/ gdrive/
147 cd ~/ gdrive
148 drive -google push --quiet --destination AFIT/Research/Results/ "$expname"-data.csv
149 drive -google push --quiet --destination AFIT/Research/Results/ "$expname"-cpu -data.
csv
150 echo "$expname DONE"
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Appendix C. OSSEC Configuration
1 <ossec_config >
2 <global >
3 <email_notification >no</email_notification >
4 <logall >yes</logall >
5 </global >
6 <command >
7 <name>static -entry</name>
8 <executable >testcommand.sh</executable >
9 <expect ></expect >
10 </command >
11 <command >
12 <name>logonly </name>
13 <executable >logOnly.sh</executable >
14 <expect ></expect >
15 </command >
16 <command >
17 <name>ACL -deny</name>
18 <executable >ACL -deny.sh</executable >
19 <expect ></expect >
20 </command >
21 <command >
22 <name>floodlight -firewall -deny</name>
23 <executable >floodlight -firewall -deny.sh</executable >
24 <expect ></expect >
25 </command >
26
27 <active -response >
28 <disabled >no</disabled >
29 <command >ACL -deny</command >
30 <location >server </location >
31 <rules_group >experiment1 </rules_group >
32 </active -response >
33 <active -response >
34 <disabled >no</disabled >
35 <command >logonly </command >
36 <location >server </location >
37 <rules_group >experiment1 </rules_group >
38 </active -response >
39 <active -response >
40 <disabled >no</disabled >
41 <command >static -entry </command >
42 <location >server </location >
43 <rules_group >experiment1 </rules_group >
44 </active -response >
45 <active -response >
46 <disabled >no</disabled >
47 <command >floodlight -firewall -deny</command >
48 <location >server </location >
49 <rules_group >experiment1 </rules_group >
50 </active -response >
51
52 <rules>
53 <include >rules_config.xml</include >
54 <include >pam_rules.xml</include >
55 <include >sshd_rules.xml</include >
56 <include >telnetd_rules.xml</include >
57 <include >syslog_rules.xml</include >
58 <include >arpwatch_rules.xml</include >
59 <include >symantec -av_rules.xml</include >
60 <include >symantec -ws_rules.xml</include >
61 <include >pix_rules.xml</include >
62 <include >named_rules.xml</include >
63 <include >smbd_rules.xml</include >
64 <include >vsftpd_rules.xml</include >
65 <include >pure -ftpd_rules.xml</include >
66 <include >proftpd_rules.xml</include >
67 <include >ms_ftpd_rules.xml</include >
68 <include >ftpd_rules.xml</include >
69 <include >hordeimp_rules.xml</include >
70 <include >roundcube_rules.xml</include >
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71 <include >wordpress_rules.xml</include >
72 <include >cimserver_rules.xml</include >
73 <include >vpopmail_rules.xml</include >
74 <include >vmpop3d_rules.xml</include >
75 <include >courier_rules.xml</include >
76 <include >web_rules.xml</include >
77 <include >web_appsec_rules.xml</include >
78 <include >apache_rules.xml</include >
79 <include >nginx_rules.xml</include >
80 <include >php_rules.xml</include >
81 <include >mysql_rules.xml</include >
82 <include >postgresql_rules.xml</include >
83 <include >ids_rules.xml</include >
84 <include >squid_rules.xml</include >
85 <include >firewall_rules.xml</include >
86 <include >apparmor_rules.xml</include >
87 <include >cisco -ios_rules.xml</include >
88 <include >netscreenfw_rules.xml</include >
89 <include >sonicwall_rules.xml</include >
90 <include >postfix_rules.xml</include >
91 <include >sendmail_rules.xml</include >
92 <include >imapd_rules.xml</include >
93 <include >mailscanner_rules.xml</include >
94 <include >dovecot_rules.xml</include >
95 <include >ms -exchange_rules.xml</include >
96 <include >racoon_rules.xml</include >
97 <include >vpn_concentrator_rules.xml</include >
98 <include >spamd_rules.xml</include >
99 <include >msauth_rules.xml</include >
100 <include >mcafee_av_rules.xml</include >
101 <include >trend -osce_rules.xml</include >
102 <include >ms -se_rules.xml</include >
103 <include >zeus_rules.xml</include >
104 <include >solaris_bsm_rules.xml</include >
105 <include >vmware_rules.xml</include >
106 <include >ms_dhcp_rules.xml</include >
107 <include >asterisk_rules.xml</include >
108 <include >ossec_rules.xml</include >
109 <include >attack_rules.xml</include >
110 <include >openbsd_rules.xml</include >
111 <include >clam_av_rules.xml</include >
112 <include >dropbear_rules.xml</include >
113 <include >sysmon_rules.xml</include >
114 <include >opensmtpd_rules.xml</include >
115 <include >local_rules.xml</include >
116 </rules>
117
118 <rootcheck >
119 <disabled >yes</disabled >
120 </rootcheck >
121
122 <global >
123 <white_list >127.0.0.1 </white_list >
124 <white_list >::1</white_list >
125 <white_list >^localhost.localdomain$ </white_list >
126 <white_list >10.1.2.2 </white_list >
127 <white_list >10.1.2.48 </white_list >
128 </global >
129
130 <remote >
131 <connection >secure </connection >
132 </remote >
133
134 <alerts >
135 <log_alert_level >1</log_alert_level >
136 </alerts >
137
138 <command >
139 <name>host -deny</name>
140 <executable >host -deny.sh</executable >
141 <expect >srcip </expect >
142 <timeout_allowed >yes</timeout_allowed >
143 </command >
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144
145 <command >
146 <name>firewall -drop</name>
147 <executable >firewall -drop.sh</executable >
148 <expect >srcip </expect >
149 <timeout_allowed >yes</timeout_allowed >
150 </command >
151
152 <command >
153 <name>disable -account </name>
154 <executable >disable -account.sh</executable >
155 <expect >user</expect >
156 <timeout_allowed >yes</timeout_allowed >
157 </command >
158
159 <command >
160 <name>restart -ossec</name>
161 <executable >restart -ossec.sh</executable >
162 <expect ></expect >
163 </command >
164
165 <command >
166 <name>route -null</name>
167 <executable >route -null.sh</executable >
168 <expect >srcip </expect >
169 <timeout_allowed >yes</timeout_allowed >
170 </command >
171
172 <!-- Files to monitor (localfiles) -->
173
174 <localfile >
175 <log_format >syslog </log_format >
176 <location >/var/log/auth.log</location >
177 </localfile >
178
179 <localfile >
180 <log_format >syslog </log_format >
181 <location >/var/log/syslog </location >
182 </localfile >
183
184 <localfile >
185 <log_format >syslog </log_format >
186 <location >/var/log/dpkg.log</location >
187 </localfile >
188
189 <localfile >
190 <log_format >command </log_format >
191 <command >df -P</command >
192 </localfile >
193
194 <localfile >
195 <log_format >full_command </log_format >
196 <command >netstat -tan |grep LISTEN |egrep -v ’(127.0.0.1| ::1)’ | sort</
command >
197 </localfile >
198
199 <localfile >
200 <log_format >full_command </log_format >
201 <command >last -n 5</command >
202 </localfile >
203
204 <database_output >
205 <hostname >localhost </hostname >
206 <username >ossecuser </username >
207 <password >ossec</password >
208 <database >ossec</database >
209 <type>mysql</type>
210 </database_output >
211
212 </ossec_config >
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Appendix D. Internal Options Configuration
1 # Analysisd default rule timeframe. Default 360
2 analysisd.default_timeframe =360
3 # Analysisd stats maximum diff.
4 analysisd.stats_maxdiff =999000
5 # Analysisd stats minimum diff. Default 150
6 analysisd.stats_mindiff =150
7 # Analysisd stats percentage (how much to differ from average) Default 150
8 analysisd.stats_percent_diff =150
9 # Analysisd FTS list size. Default 32
10 analysisd.fts_list_size =32
11 # Analysisd FTS minimum string size.
12 analysisd.fts_min_size_for_str =14
13 # Analysisd Enable the firewall log (at logs/firewall/firewall.log)
14 # 1 to enable , 0 to disable.
15 analysisd.log_fw =1
16
17 # Logcollector file loop timeout (check every 2 seconds for file changes)
18 logcollector.loop_timeout =2
19
20 # Logcollector number of attempts to open a log file.
21 logcollector.open_attempts =8
22
23 # Logcollector - If it should accept remote commands from the manager
24 logcollector.remote_commands =0
25
26 # Remoted counter io flush. Default 128
27 remoted.recv_counter_flush =128
28
29 # Remoted compression averages printout.
30 remoted.comp_average_printout =19999
31
32 # Verify msg id (set to 0 to disable it)
33 remoted.verify_msg_id =0
34
35 # Maild strict checking (0= disabled , 1= enabled)
36 maild.strict_checking =1
37
38 # Maild grouping (0= disabled , 1= enabled)
39 # Groups alerts within the same e-mail.
40 maild.groupping =1
41
42 # Maild full subject (0= disabled , 1= enabled)
43 maild.full_subject =0
44
45 # Maild display GeoIP data (0= disabled , 1= enabled)
46 maild.geoip =1
47
48 # Monitord day_wait. Ammount of seconds to wait before compressing/signing
49 # the files.
50 monitord.day_wait =10
51
52 # Monitord compress. (0=do not compress , 1= compress)
53 monitord.compress =1
54
55 # Monitord sign. (0=do not sign , 1=sign)
56 monitord.sign=1
57
58 # Monitord monitor_agents. (0=do not monitor , 1= monitor)
59 monitord.monitor_agents =1
60
61
62 # Syscheck checking/usage speed. To avoid large cpu/memory
63 # usage , you can specify how much to sleep after generating
64 # the checksum of X files. The default is to sleep 2 seconds
65 # after reading 15 files.
66 syscheck.sleep=2
67 syscheck.sleep_after =15
68
69
70 # Database - maximum number of reconnect attempts
99
71 dbd.reconnect_attempts =20
72
73 # Debug options.
74 # Debug 0 -> no debug
75 # Debug 1 -> first level of debug
76 # Debug 2 -> full debugging
77
78 # Windows debug (used by the windows agent)
79 windows.debug =0
80
81 # Syscheck (local , server and unix agent)
82 syscheck.debug=0
83
84 # Remoted (server debug)
85 remoted.debug =0
86
87 # Analysisd (server or local)
88 analysisd.debug=0
89
90 # Log collector (server , local or unix agent)
91 logcollector.debug =0
92
93 # Unix agentd
94 agent.debug =0
95
96 # EOF
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Appendix E. Floodlight Properties
1 floodlight.modules =\
2 net.floodlightcontroller.jython.JythonDebugInterface ,\
3 net.floodlightcontroller.storage.memory.MemoryStorageSource ,\
4 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.FloodlightProvider ,\
5 net.floodlightcontroller.threadpool.ThreadPool ,\
6 net.floodlightcontroller.debugcounter.DebugCounterServiceImpl ,\
7 net.floodlightcontroller.perfmon.PktInProcessingTime ,\
8 net.floodlightcontroller.staticentry.StaticEntryPusher ,\
9 net.floodlightcontroller.restserver.RestApiServer ,\
10 net.floodlightcontroller.topology.TopologyManager ,\
11 net.floodlightcontroller.routing.RoutingManager ,\
12 net.floodlightcontroller.forwarding.Forwarding ,\
13 net.floodlightcontroller.linkdiscovery.internal.LinkDiscoveryManager ,\
14 net.floodlightcontroller.ui.web.StaticWebRoutable ,\
15 net.floodlightcontroller.loadbalancer.LoadBalancer ,\
16 net.floodlightcontroller.firewall.Firewall ,\
17 net.floodlightcontroller.simpleft.FT ,\
18 net.floodlightcontroller.devicemanager.internal.DeviceManagerImpl ,\
19 net.floodlightcontroller.accesscontrollist.ACL ,\
20 net.floodlightcontroller.statistics.StatisticsCollector
21 org.sdnplatform.sync.internal.SyncManager.authScheme=CHALLENGE_RESPONSE
22 org.sdnplatform.sync.internal.SyncManager.keyStorePath =/etc/floodlight/key2.jceks
23 org.sdnplatform.sync.internal.SyncManager.dbPath =/var/lib/floodlight/
24 org.sdnplatform.sync.internal.SyncManager.keyStorePassword=PassWord
25 org.sdnplatform.sync.internal.SyncManager.port =6009
26 org.sdnplatform.sync.internal.SyncManager.thisNodeId =1
27 org.sdnplatform.sync.internal.SyncManager.persistenceEnabled=FALSE
28 org.sdnplatform.sync.internal.SyncManager.nodes =[\
29 {"nodeId": 1, "domainId": 1, "hostname": "192.168.1.100", "port": 6642} ,\
30 {"nodeId": 2, "domainId": 1, "hostname": "192.168.1.100", "port": 6643}\
31 ]
32 net.floodlightcontroller.forwarding.Forwarding.match=in-port , vlan , mac , ip,
transport
33 net.floodlightcontroller.forwarding.Forwarding.detailed -match=src -mac , dst -mac , src -
ip, dst -ip, src -transport , dst -transport
34 net.floodlightcontroller.forwarding.Forwarding.flood -arp=NO
35 net.floodlightcontroller.forwarding.Forwarding.idle -timeout =5
36 net.floodlightcontroller.forwarding.Forwarding.set -send -flow -rem -flag=FALSE
37 net.floodlightcontroller.forwarding.Forwarding.remove -flows -on -link -or-port -down=TRUE
38 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.FloodlightProvider.role=ACTIVE
39 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.FloodlightProvider.controllerId =1
40 net.floodlightcontroller.linkdiscovery.internal.LinkDiscoveryManager.latency -history -
size =10
41 net.floodlightcontroller.linkdiscovery.internal.LinkDiscoveryManager.latency -update -
threshold =0.5
42 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.FloodlightProvider.
shutdownOnTransitionToStandby=true
43 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.openFlowPort =6653
44 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.openFlowAddresses =0.0.0.0
45 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.workerThreads =16
46 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.bossThreads =1
47 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.connectionBacklog =1000
48 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.connectionTimeoutMs =60000
49 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.
defaultMaxTablesToReceiveTableMissFlow =1
50 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.
maxTablesToReceiveTableMissFlowPerDpid ={"00 :00:00:00:00:00:00:01":"1","2":"1"}
51 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.
clearTablesOnInitialHandshakeAsMaster=YES
52 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.
clearTablesOnEachTransitionToMaster=YES
53 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.keyStorePath =/home/ubuntu/
floodlight -master/floodlight/switch -keystore.jks
54 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.keyStorePassword=PassFL
55 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.useSsl=YES
56 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.supportedOpenFlowVersions =1.0,
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5
57 net.floodlightcontroller.core.internal.OFSwitchManager.switchesInitialState ={"00
:00:00:00:00:00:00:01":"ROLE_MASTER","00 :00:00:00:00:00:00:02":"ROLE_MASTER", "00
:00:00:00:00:00:00:03":"ROLE_MASTER", "00 :00:00:00:00:00:00:04":"ROLE_MASTER","00
:00:00:00:00:00:00:05":"ROLE_MASTER"}
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58 net.floodlightcontroller.restserver.RestApiServer.keyStorePath =/home/ubuntu/
floodlight -master/floodlight/rest -keystore.jks
59 net.floodlightcontroller.restserver.RestApiServer.keyStorePassword=changeit
60 net.floodlightcontroller.restserver.RestApiServer.httpsNeedClientAuthentication=YES
61 net.floodlightcontroller.restserver.RestApiServer.useHttps=YES
62 net.floodlightcontroller.restserver.RestApiServer.useHttp=NO
63 net.floodlightcontroller.restserver.RestApiServer.httpsPort =8081
64 net.floodlightcontroller.restserver.RestApiServer.httpPort =8080
65 net.floodlightcontroller.restserver.RestApiServer.accessControlAllowAllOrigins=FALSE
66 net.floodlightcontroller.statistics.StatisticsCollector.enable=FALSE
67 net.floodlightcontroller.statistics.StatisticsCollector.
collectionIntervalPortStatsSeconds =10
68 net.floodlightcontroller.topology.TopologyManager.pathMetric=latency
69 net.floodlightcontroller.topology.TopologyManager.maxPathsToCompute =3
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Appendix F. Active Response Script
1 #!/bin/sh
2 # Generates SDN Active Response
3 # Author: Jon Goodgion
4
5 # Save the bash call start time
6 BASHSTARTTIME=‘date +%H:%M:%S.%N‘
7
8 #Store local directory structure
9 LOCAL=‘dirname $0 ‘;
10 cd $LOCAL
11 cd ../
12 PWD=‘pwd ‘
13
14 #Store command line args
15 ACTION=$1
16 USER=$2
17 ALERTID=$4
18 RULEID=$5
19
20 #Src -ip pulled from ossec location info
21 SRCIP=‘echo "$7" | cut --delimiter=’-’ --fields=1‘
22
23 #Global values and dummy destination IP
24 DSTIP="1.2.3.4"
25 ADDACTION="add"
26 DELACTION="delete"
27
28 # ACL ACTION
29 if [ "$ACTION" = "$ADDACTION" ]; then
30 #Query Secure REST API
31 ACLRESPONSE=‘curl --cacert /rest -cacert.pem --cert /ossec -selfsigned.crt --key /
ossec -selfsigned.key -X POST -d "{\"src -ip\":\"$SRCIP /32\",\"dst -ip\":\"$DSTIP
/32\",\"action\":\"deny\"}" https ://10.131.0.10:8081/ wm/acl/rules/json ‘
32 if [ "$ACLRESPONSE" = ’{"status" : "Success! New rule added."}’ ]; then
33 echo "BASH -START:$BASHSTARTTIME ACL -ADD:‘date +%H:%M:%S.%N‘ SRCIP:$SRCIP
ALERTID:$4 RULEID:$5 AGENTNAME:$6" >> /var/ossec/logs/active -responses.
log
34 elif [ "$ACLRESPONSE" = ’{"status" : "Failed! The new ACL rule matches an existing
rule."}’ ]; then
35 echo "BASH -START:$BASHSTARTTIME ACL -MATCH:‘date +%H:%M:%S.%N‘ SRCIP:$SRCIP
ALERTID:$4 RULEID:$5 AGENTNAME:$6" >> /var/ossec/logs/active -responses.log
36 else
37 echo "ERROR: Couldn ’t add or test ACL entry" >> /var/ossec/logs/active -responses.
log
38 fi
39 elif [ "$ACTION" = "$DELACTION" ]; then
40 ACLRULEID=‘curl --cacert /rest -cacert.pem --cert /ossec -selfsigned.crt --key /ossec
-selfsigned.key https ://10.131.0.10:8081/ wm/acl/rules/json | jq ".[] | select (.
nw_src == \"$SRCIP /32\" and .nw_dst == \"$DSTIP /32\") | .id"‘
41 ACLRESPONSE=‘curl --cacert /rest -cacert.pem --cert /ossec -selfsigned.crt --key /
ossec -selfsigned.key -X DELETE -d "{\"ruleid\":\"$ACLRULEID\" }" https
://10.131.0.10:8081/ wm/acl/rules/json ‘
42 if [ "$ACLRESPONSE" = ’{"status" : "Success! Rule deleted"}’ ]; then
43 echo "ACL rule $ACLRULEID Deleted. SRCIP=$SRCIP DSTIP=$DSTIP ALERTID=
$4 RULEID=$5 $6" >> /var/ossec/logs/active -responses.log
44 else
45 echo "ERROR: Couldn ’t delete ACL entry" >> /var/ossec/logs/active -responses.log
46 fi
47 else
48 echo "Comparisons failed" >> /var/ossec/logs/active -responses.log
49 fi
50
51 #FIREWALL ACTION
52 if [ "$ACTION" = "$ADDACTION" ]; then
53 RESPONSE=‘curl --cacert /rest -cacert.pem --cert /ossec -selfsigned.crt --key /ossec -
selfsigned.key -X POST -d ’{"src -ip": "192.168.0.109/32", "dst -ip": "
192.168.0.103/32", "action":"deny"}’ https ://10.131.0.10:8081/ wm/firewall/rules
/json ‘
54 if [[ $RESPONSE == *"added"* ]]; then
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55 echo "BASH -START:$BASHSTARTTIME FIREWALL -ADD:‘date +%H:%M:%S.%N‘ SRCIP:
$SRCIP ALERTID:$4 RULEID:$5 AGENTNAME:$6" >> /var/ossec/logs/active -
responses.log
56 elif [ "$RESPONSE" = ’{"status" : "Error! A similar firewall rule already exists."
}’ ]; then
57 echo "BASH -START:$BASHSTARTTIME FIREWALL -MATCH:‘date +%H:%M:%S.%N‘ SRCIP:$SRCIP
ALERTID:$4 RULEID:$5 AGENTNAME:$6" >> /var/ossec/logs/active -responses.log
58 else
59 echo "ERROR: Couldn ’t add firewall entry" >> /var/ossec/logs/active -responses.log
60 fi
61 else
62 echo "Add/Delete Action Comparisons failed. No curl attempted." >> /var/ossec/logs/
active -responses.log
63 fi
64
65 #STATIC FLOW ACTION
66 if [ "$ACTION" = "$ADDACTION" ]; then
67 #get the switch ID that the alerting host is connected to by querying Floodlight
68 SWITCHID=‘curl --cacert /rest -cacert.pem --cert /ossec -selfsigned.crt --key /ossec -
selfsigned.key -s "https ://10.131.0.10:8081/ wm/device /?ipv4=$SRCIP" | jq -r ’.
devices [0]. attachmentPoint [0]. switch ’‘
69 #SWITCHID ="5e:3e:c4 :54:44:4f:2b:ba"
70
71 #Request flow insert for network response/reconfiguration vis secure REST Query:
72 FLOWRESPONSE=‘curl --cacert /rest -cacert.pem --cert /ossec -selfsigned.crt --key /
ossec -selfsigned.key -X POST -d "{\"switch\":\"$SWITCHID\", \"name\":\"$ALERTID
\", \"eth_type\":\"0x0800\", \"cookie\":\"0\", \"priority\":\"1\", \"in_port\"
:\"1\", \"active\":\"true\", \"actions\":\"output =1\"}" https
://10.131.0.10:8081/ wm/staticflowpusher/json ‘
73
74 #Log successful flow entry in Active Response log
75 if [ "$FLOWRESPONSE" = ’{"status" : "Entry pushed"}’ ]; then
76 echo "BASH -START:$BASHSTARTTIME FLOW -ADD:‘date +%H:%M:%S.%N‘ SRCIP:$SRCIP ALERTID
:$4 RULEID:$5 AGENTNAME:$6" >> ${PWD }/../ logs/active -responses.log
77 fi
78
79 #Delete the flow to allow subsequent ones to actually reach the switch
80 curl -X DELETE -d ’{"name":"EXPERIMENT"}’ http ://10.131.0.10:8080/ wm/
staticflowpusher/json
81 else
82 echo "Add/Delete Action Comparisons failed. No logging attempted." >> /var/ossec/
logs/active -responses.log
83 fi
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Appendix G. Data Parsing
1 import java.util .*;
2 import java.io.*;
3 import java.sql.*;
4
5 class dataParser4 {
6
7 private static final String COMMA_DELIMITER = ",";
8 private static final String NEW_LINE_SEPERATOR = "\n";
9 private static final String COLUMN_HEADER = "trialnumber ,eps ,agent -id ,alert -id ,
alert -level ,start -time ,start -time -offset ,start -time -adjusted ,end -time ,
difference ,bashAR -start ,difference -ARbash";
10
11 public static void main(String [] args) {
12 Connection conn = null;
13 Statement stmt = null;
14 String fileNameArg = "";
15 String outputFileName = "";
16 String trialNumber = "";
17 String numEPS = "";
18 int logCount = 0;
19 int rawlogTotalCount = 0;
20 int rawlogExperimentCount = 0;
21 if (args.length > 0) {
22 try {
23 trialNumber = args [1];
24 fileNameArg = args [0] + trialNumber + "-";
25 String [] filenametokens = fileNameArg.split("-");
26 double numAgents = Double.parseDouble(filenametokens [0]);
27 double epsPerAgent = Double.parseDouble(filenametokens [1]);
28 numEPS = Double.toString(numAgents * epsPerAgent);
29 outputFileName = args [0] + "-";
30 // System.out.println (" Filename argument: " + fileNameArg);
31 } catch (Exception e) {
32 System.err.println("Invalid argument. Expect test string (e.g. 2-100-1");
33 System.exit (1);
34 }
35 }
36
37 //Get starting time
38 String startSeconds = "";
39 try {
40 String fullfile = fileNameArg + "startTime.txt";
41 System.out.println("Reading file: " + fullfile);
42 File file = new File(fileNameArg + "startTime.txt");
43 Scanner input = new Scanner(file);
44 String fullTime = input.next();
45 String [] tokens = fullTime.split(":");
46 startSeconds = tokens [2];
47 System.out.println("Starting time trimmed: " + startSeconds);
48 } catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
49 System.err.println("File not found.");
50 System.exit (1);
51 }
52
53 // Process everything else
54 try {
55 // Register mysql driver
56 Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver");
57
58 //Open a connection
59 System.out.println("Connecting to database ...");
60 conn = DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:mysql ://192.168.0.3:3306/ ossec","
ossecuser", "ossec");
61
62 //Build scanner for raw archive logs
63 File rawLogs = new File(fileNameArg + "rawLogs.txt");
64 Scanner rawLogScanner = new Scanner(rawLogs);
65
66 //Count number of raw archived logs
67 while(rawLogScanner.hasNext ()) {
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68 rawlogTotalCount ++;
69 String nextRawLine = rawLogScanner.nextLine ();
70 String [] rawLogTokens = nextRawLine.split(" +|[=]");
71 if(rawLogTokens.length == 21) {
72 rawlogExperimentCount ++;
73 }
74 }
75 //Build scanner for AR logs
76 File arLogs = new File(fileNameArg + "activeResponse.txt");
77 Scanner arLogScanner = new Scanner(arLogs);
78
79 System.out.println("Processings files: " + fileNameArg + "activeResponse.txt &
" + fileNameArg + "rawLogs.txt");
80
81 //Build headers on output csv file if it is the first trial
82 FileWriter fileWriter = new FileWriter(outputFileName + "data.csv", true);
83 if (trialNumber.equals("1")) {
84 fileWriter.append(COLUMN_HEADER.toString ());
85 fileWriter.append(NEW_LINE_SEPERATOR);
86 }
87
88 //While there are still log entries
89 while(arLogScanner.hasNext ()) {
90 logCount ++;
91 //Get and split AR log
92 String nextARLogLine = arLogScanner.nextLine ();
93 String [] rawARTokens = nextARLogLine.split("[ :]");
94 String flowAddTime = rawARTokens [7];
95 String bashStartTime = rawARTokens [3];
96 String alertID = rawARTokens [11];
97 String agentId = rawARTokens [15]. replace("(", "").replace(")", "");
98
99 // Execute a sql query to get full log
100 stmt = conn.createStatement ();
101 String sql;
102 sql = "SELECT * FROM ossec.alert where alertid = ’" + alertID + "’";
103 ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);
104
105 // Extract data from result set
106 // Retrieve the entry
107 rs.next();
108 String full_log = rs.getString("full_log");
109
110 //DEBUG: Display values
111 // System.out.println (" alertID =" + alertID + " -- " + full_log);
112
113 //Clean -up environment
114 rs.close ();
115 stmt.close();
116
117 //Split the raw log
118 String [] rawLogTokens = full_log.split(" +|[=]");
119
120 //DEBUG token values
121 //for (int i = 0; i < rawLogTokens.length; i++) {
122 // System.out.println ("Token" + i + ": " + rawLogTokens[i]);
123 //}
124
125 String experimentid = rawLogTokens [12];
126 String alertLevel = rawLogTokens [10];
127 String timeoffset = rawLogTokens [14];
128
129 // Calculate the adjusted start time
130 double startTimeAdjustedDouble = Double.parseDouble(timeoffset);
131
132 // Calculate the flow add time difference
133 double timeDifference = Double.parseDouble(flowAddTime) -
startTimeAdjustedDouble;
134 // Compensate for wrapping on minute
135 if(timeDifference < 0) {
136 timeDifference = timeDifference + 60;
137 }
138
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139 // Calculate the bash start time difference
140 double timeDifferenceBash = Double.parseDouble(bashStartTime) -
startTimeAdjustedDouble;
141 // Compensate for wrapping on minute
142 if(timeDifferenceBash < 0) {
143 timeDifferenceBash = timeDifferenceBash + 60;
144 }
145
146 // Append all values to this row in csv
147 fileWriter.append(trialNumber);
148 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
149 fileWriter.append(numEPS);
150 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
151 fileWriter.append(agentId);
152 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
153 fileWriter.append(experimentid);
154 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
155 fileWriter.append(alertLevel);
156 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
157 fileWriter.append(startSeconds);
158 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
159 fileWriter.append(timeoffset);
160 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
161 fileWriter.append(Double.toString(startTimeAdjustedDouble));
162 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
163 fileWriter.append(flowAddTime);
164 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
165 fileWriter.append(Double.toString(timeDifference));
166 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
167 fileWriter.append(bashStartTime);
168 fileWriter.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
169 fileWriter.append(Double.toString(timeDifferenceBash));
170 fileWriter.append(NEW_LINE_SEPERATOR);
171 } //END - no more logs to process
172
173 fileWriter.flush ();
174 fileWriter.close ();
175 conn.close();
176
177 System.out.println("Success. Output to " + outputFileName + "data.csv");
178
179
180 System.out.println("Processing cpu logs: " + fileNameArg + "cpuUsage.txt");
181 //Build scanner for CPU files
182 File osseccpuLog = new File(fileNameArg + "cpuUsage.txt");
183 Scanner osseccpuLogScanner = new Scanner(osseccpuLog);
184
185 File floodlightcpuLog = new File("/home/ubuntu/cpuUsage.log");
186 Scanner floodlightcpuLogScanner = new Scanner(floodlightcpuLog);
187
188 //Build csv writer
189 FileWriter fileWriter2 = new FileWriter(outputFileName + "cpu -data.csv", true);
190 if (trialNumber.equals("1")) {
191 fileWriter2.append("time ,ossec -cpu -usage ,floodlight -cpu -usage");
192 fileWriter2.append(NEW_LINE_SEPERATOR);
193 }
194 while(osseccpuLogScanner.hasNext () && floodlightcpuLogScanner.hasNext ()) {
195 //Get and split next cpu logs
196 String nextOssecCpuLogLine = osseccpuLogScanner.nextLine ();
197 String [] rawOssecCpuTokens = nextOssecCpuLogLine.split("[ ]");
198 String nextFloodlightCpuLogLine = floodlightcpuLogScanner.nextLine ();
199 String [] rawFloodlightCpuTokens = nextFloodlightCpuLogLine.split("[ ]");
200 // Append all values to this row in csv
201 fileWriter2.append(rawFloodlightCpuTokens [0]);
202 fileWriter2.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
203 fileWriter2.append(rawOssecCpuTokens [1]);
204 fileWriter2.append(COMMA_DELIMITER);
205 fileWriter2.append(rawFloodlightCpuTokens [1]);
206 fileWriter2.append(NEW_LINE_SEPERATOR);
207 }
208 fileWriter2.flush();
209 fileWriter2.close();
210 System.out.println("Success. Output to " + outputFileName + "cpu -data.csv");
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211 System.out.println(logCount + " active response logs");
212 System.out.println(rawlogExperimentCount + " archived experiment raw logs");
213 System.out.println(rawlogTotalCount + " archived total raw logs");
214
215 } catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
216 System.err.println("File not found.");
217 System.exit (1);
218 } catch (IOException e) {
219 System.err.println("IO exception.");
220 System.exit (1);
221 } catch(SQLException se){
222 // Handle errors for JDBC
223 se.printStackTrace ();
224 }catch(Exception e){
225 // Handle errors for Class.forName
226 e.printStackTrace ();
227 } finally{
228 // finally block used to close resources
229 try{
230 if(stmt!=null)
231 stmt.close();
232 }catch(SQLException se2){
233 }// nothing we can do
234 try{
235 if(conn!=null)
236 conn.close();
237 }catch(SQLException se){
238 se.printStackTrace ();
239 }//end finally try
240 }//end try
241
242 }
243 }
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Appendix H. Networking Parameters
1 # /etc/sysctl.conf
2 # Increase system file descriptor limit
3 fs.file -max = 10000
4
5 # Discourage Linux from swapping idle processes to disk (default = 60)
6 vm.swappiness = 10
7
8 # Increase ephermeral IP ports
9 net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 10000 65000
10
11 # Increase Linux autotuning TCP buffer limits
12 # Set max to 16MB for 1GE and 32M (33554432) or 54M (56623104) for 10GE, letting the
kernel scale it based on RAM.
13 net.core.rmem_max = 16777216
14 net.core.wmem_max = 16777216
15 net.core.rmem_default = 16777216
16 net.core.wmem_default = 16777216
17 net.core.optmem_max = 40960
18 net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 16777216
19 net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 65536 16777216
20
21 # Make room for more TIME_WAIT sockets due to more clients ,
22 # and allow them to be reused if we run out of sockets
23 # Also increase the max packet backlog
24 net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 50000
25 net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 30000
26 net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets = 2000000
27 net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse = 1
28 net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 10
29
30 # Disable TCP slow start on idle connections
31 net.ipv4.tcp_slow_start_after_idle = 0
32
33 # Also up the UDP limits
34 net.ipv4.udp_rmem_min = 8192
35 net.ipv4.udp_wmem_min = 8192
36
37 # Disable source routing and redirects
38 net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
39 net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
40 net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
41
42 # Log packets with impossible addresses for security
43 net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
44
45 # /etc/security/limits.conf
46 # allow all users to open 10000 files
47 * soft nofile 10000
48 * hard nofile 10000
49
50 # /etc/ssh/sshd_config
51 # ensure we consult pam
52 UsePAM yes
53
54 # /etc/pam.d/sshd
55 # ensure pam includes our limits
56 session required pam_limits.so
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Appendix I. R Analysis Script: Tests 1-4
1 library(ggplot2)
2 library(plyr)
3 library(colorspace)
4 library(RColorBrewer)
5 library(reshape2)
6
7 # -- PLOTTING FUNTIONS ----------------------------------------
8
9 #Creates scatter plot for the RT of each alert ID with multiple agents
10 #Points are colored by agent ID
11 createScatterPlotMulti <- function(dataset=NULL) {
12 ggplot(dataset , aes(x=alert.id , y=difference)) +
13 geom_point(shape=1, aes(color=agent.id)) +
14 labs(size=4, x="Alert ID",y="Response Time (s)", color="Agent ID") +
15 scale_color_brewer(palette = "Paired", labels = c("Agent 101", "Agent 102", "
Agent 103", "Agent 104"
16 , "Agent 105", "Agent 106", "
Agent 107", "Agent 108"
17 , "Agent 109", "Agent 110"))
+
18 theme_bw () +
19 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="
bold"))
20 }
21
22 #Creates scatter plot of each alert ID for single agent
23 createScatterPlotSingle <- function(dataset=NULL) {
24 ggplot(dataset , aes(x=alert.id , y=difference)) +
25 geom_point(shape =1) +
26 labs(size=4, x="Alert ID",y="Response Time (s)") +
27 theme_bw () +
28 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold
"))
29 }
30
31 #Creates scatter plot for the RT of each row in the dataset
32 #Index indicates the order processed in OSSEC
33 createScatterPlotIndex <- function(dataset=NULL) {
34 ggplot(dataset , aes(x=index , y=difference)) +
35 geom_point(shape =1) +
36 ggtitle("Individual Alert Response Time") +
37 labs(size=4, x="Alert Index",y="Response Time (s)") +
38 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold
"),
39 plot.title = element_text(size = rel (2)))
40 }
41 # -- ALERT ID / INDEX PLOTTING -----------------------------------------------------
42
43 #Read and create data frames
44 input = "1-250- logonly2"
45 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
46 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
47 results = read.csv(filepath)
48 createScatterPlotSingle(results)
49 input = "10-250- logonly"
50 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
51 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
52 results = read.csv(filepath)
53 createScatterPlotMulti(results)
54 input = "10-1000- logonly"
55 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
56 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
57 results = read.csv(filepath)
58
59 #Create index column
60 results$index = seq.int(nrow(results))
61 results$index = as.numeric(as.character(results$index))
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62
63 #Plot by alert ID and index ID
64 createScatterPlotSingle(results)
65 createScatterPlotIndex(results)
66
67 # -- 500 EPS Datasets -----------------------------------------------------
68
69 #Read and create data frames - New data (3 Jan 17) for 500 EPS
70 input = "10-50- NEWfirewallTRIALS"
71 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
72 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
73 firewallresults = read.csv(filepath)
74 input = "10-50- NEWstaticTRIALS"
75 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
76 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
77 staticresults = read.csv(filepath)
78 input = "10-50- NEWlogTRIALS"
79 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
80 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
81 logresults = read.csv(filepath)
82 input = "10-50- NEWaclTRIALS"
83 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
84 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
85 aclresults = read.csv(filepath)
86 input = "10-10- NEWacl20TRIALS"
87 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
88 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
89 aclresults = read.csv(filepath)
90 input = "10-50- NEWacl10a"
91 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
92 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
93 aclresults = read.csv(filepath)
94
95 #Read and create data frames - Original data (13 Dec 16) for 500 EPS
96 input = "10-50- lognosslTRIAL"
97 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
98 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
99 logresults = read.csv(filepath)
100 input = "10-50- aclnosslTRIAL"
101 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
102 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
103 aclresults = read.csv(filepath)
104 input = "10-50- firewallnosslTRIAL"
105 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
106 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
107 firewallresults = read.csv(filepath)
108 input = "10-50- staticnosslTRIAL"
109 filename = paste(input , "-data.csv", sep="")
110 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
111 staticresults = read.csv(filepath)
112
113 #Add rows to distingush type
114 logresults$type = "Log -Only"
115 aclresults$type = "ACL"
116 firewallresults$type = "Firewall"
117 staticresults$type = "Static Flow"
118
119 #Summary analysis on each type ’s RT measurement
120 logSE = summarySE(logresults , measurevar = "difference", groupvars = c("type"))
121 aclSE = summarySE(aclresults , measurevar = "difference", groupvars = c("type"))
122 firewallSE = summarySE(firewallresults , measurevar = "difference", groupvars = c("
type"))
123 staticSE = summarySE(staticresults , measurevar = "difference", groupvars = c("type"))
111
124
125 #Combine the results
126 combinedresults = rbind(logresults , aclresults , firewallresults , staticresults)
127 combinedSE = rbind(logSE , aclSE , firewallSE , staticSE)
128
129 #Plot the mean response times with CI bars
130 ggplot(combinedSE , aes(x=type , y=difference)) +
131 geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=difference -ci, ymax=difference+ci), width =.5) +
132 geom_point () +
133 labs(size=4, x="SDN Response Type",y="Response Time (s)") +
134 theme_bw () +
135 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
136
137 #Pairwise T-tests on type
138 pairwise.t.test(combinedresults$difference , combinedresults$type , p.adjust.method = "
holm")
139
140 # -- RESPONSE TIME PER TRIAL BOX PLOTS --------------------------------
141
142 #Boxplots per trial for each response type
143 ggplot(logresults , aes(factor(trialnumber), difference)) +
144 geom_boxplot () +
145 geom_jitter(alpha=.2, shape =16, size =1) +
146 labs(size=4, x="Trial #",y="Response Time (s)") +
147 theme_bw () +
148 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
149 ggplot(aclresults , aes(factor(trialnumber), difference)) +
150 geom_boxplot () +
151 geom_jitter(alpha=.2, shape =16, size =1) +
152 labs(size=4, x="Trial #",y="Response Time (s)") +
153 theme_bw () +
154 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
155 ggplot(firewallresults , aes(factor(trialnumber), difference)) +
156 geom_boxplot () +
157 geom_jitter(alpha=.2, shape =16, size =1) +
158 labs(size=4, x="Trial #",y="Response Time (s)") +
159 theme_bw () +
160 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
161 ggplot(staticresults , aes(factor(trialnumber), difference)) +
162 geom_boxplot () +
163 geom_jitter(alpha=.2, shape =16, size =1) +
164 labs(size=4, x="Trial #",y="Response Time (s)") +
165 theme_bw () +
166 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
167
168 #Box Plot for each method , consolidated trials
169 ggplot(combinedresults , aes(x=type , y=difference)) +
170 geom_boxplot () +
171 geom_jitter(alpha=.1, shape =16, size =.5) +
172 labs(size=4, x="SDN Response Type",y="Response Time (s)") +
173 theme_bw () +
174 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
175
176 # - CPU DATA IMPORT AND SUMMARY ----------------------------------------
177
178 input = "10-50- lognosslTRIAL"
179 filename = paste(input , "-cpu -data.csv", sep="")
180 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
181 cpulogresults = read.csv(filepath)
182
183 input = "10-50- aclnosslTRIAL"
184 filename = paste(input , "-cpu -data.csv", sep="")
185 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
186 cpuaclresults = read.csv(filepath)
187
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188 input = "10-50- firewallnosslTRIAL"
189 filename = paste(input , "-cpu -data.csv", sep="")
190 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
191 cpufirewallresults = read.csv(filepath)
192
193 input = "10-50- staticnosslTRIAL"
194 filename = paste(input , "-cpu -data.csv", sep="")
195 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
196 cpustaticresults = read.csv(filepath)
197
198 cpulogresults$type = "Log -Only"
199 cpuaclresults$type = "ACL"
200 cpufirewallresults$type = "Firewall"
201 cpustaticresults$type = "Static Flow"
202
203 ## Only include first second of each test
204 cpulogresults.firstten = cpulogresults[c(1,11,21 ,31,41 ,51,61,71 ,81,91) ,]
205 cpuaclresults.firstten = cpuaclresults[c(1,11,21 ,31,41 ,51,61,71 ,81,91) ,]
206 cpufirewallresults.firstten = cpufirewallresults[c(1,11,21 ,31,41,51 ,61,71,81 ,91) ,]
207 cpustaticresults.firstten = cpustaticresults[c(1,11 ,21,31,41 ,51,61,71 ,81,91) ,]
208
209 #Perform SE on each
210 cpulogSE = summarySE(cpulogresults.firstten , measurevar = "ossec.cpu.usage",
groupvars = c("type"))
211 cpuaclSE = summarySE(cpuaclresults.firstten , measurevar = "ossec.cpu.usage",
groupvars = c("type"))
212 cpufirewallSE = summarySE(cpufirewallresults.firstten , measurevar = "ossec.cpu.usage"
, groupvars = c("type"))
213 cpustaticSE = summarySE(cpustaticresults.firstten , measurevar = "ossec.cpu.usage",
groupvars = c("type"))
214
215 cpuresultscombined.ALL = rbind(cpulogresults , cpustaticresults , cpuaclresults ,
cpufirewallresults)
216 #cpuresultscombined.SUBSET = rbind(subset(cpulogresults , ossec.cpu.usage > .3),
subset(cpuaclresults , ossec.cpu.usage > 1), subset(cpufirewallresults , ossec.cpu.
usage > 1), subset(cpustaticresults , ossec.cpu.usage > 1))
217 cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN = rbind(cpulogresults.firstten , cpustaticresults.firstten
, cpuaclresults.firstten , cpufirewallresults.firstten)
218 cpuOSSECcombinedSE = rbind(cpulogSE , cpuaclSE , cpufirewallSE , cpustaticSE)
219
220 ## CI on means - first ten only OSSEC cpu
221 ggplot(cpuOSSECcombinedSE , aes(x=type , y=ossec.cpu.usage)) +
222 geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=ossec.cpu.usage -ci, ymax=ossec.cpu.usage+ci), width =.5) +
223 geom_point () +
224 ggtitle("") +
225 labs(size=4, x="SDN Response Type",y="CPU Utilization (%)") +
226 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
, plot.title = element_text(size = rel (2)))
227
228 # - CPU DATA JITTER PLOTS (APPENDIX)
-------------------------------------------------
229
230 ## jitter plot ALL points OSSEC CPU
231 ggplot(cpuresultscombined.ALL , aes(x=type , y=ossec.cpu.usage)) +
232 geom_point () +
233 geom_jitter () +
234 labs(size=4, x="SDN Response Type",y="CPU Utilization (%)") +
235 theme_bw () +
236 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
237
238 ## jitter plot ALL points Floodlight CPU
239 ggplot(cpuresultscombined.ALL , aes(x=type , y=floodlight.cpu.usage)) +
240 geom_point () +
241 geom_jitter () +
242 labs(size=4, x="SDN Response Type",y="CPU Utilization (%)") +
243 theme_bw () +
244 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
245
246 ## jitter plot FIRST TEN points OSSEC CPU
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247 ggplot(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN , aes(x=type , y=ossec.cpu.usage)) +
248 geom_point () +
249 geom_jitter () +
250 labs(size=4, x="SDN Response Type",y="CPU Utilization (%)") +
251 theme_bw () +
252 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
253
254 ## jitter plot FIRST TEN points Floodlight CPU
255 ggplot(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN , aes(x=type , y=floodlight.cpu.usage)) +
256 geom_point () +
257 geom_jitter () +
258 labs(size=4, x="SDN Response Type",y="CPU Utilization (%)") +
259 theme_bw () +
260 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
261
262 # - CPU BOXPLOTS -------------------------------------------------
263
264 #Prep and reshape dataframe
265 cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN = rename(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN , c("floodlight.cpu.
usage"="Floodlight", "ossec.cpu.usage"="OSSEC"))
266 cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN = melt(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN)
267 cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN = rename(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN , c("variable"="
server"))
268 cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN.SE = summarySE(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN , measurevar =
"value", groupvars = c("type", "server"))
269
270 ### boxplot -bothservers -expected
271 ggplot(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN , aes(x=type , y=value , color=server)) +
272 geom_boxplot () +
273 labs(size=4, x="SDN Response Type",y="CPU Utilization (%)",color="Server") +
274 theme_bw () +
275 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
276
277 ## CI on means - both OSSEC and FLOODLIGHT
278 ggplot(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN.SE, aes(x=type , y=value , color=server)) +
279 geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=value -ci, ymax=value+ci), width =.5) +
280 geom_point () +
281 labs(size=4, x="SDN Response Type",y="CPU Utilization (%)",color="Server") +
282 theme_bw () +
283 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
284
285 ## -- CPU ANOVA -----------------------------------------------
286
287 cpuresultsOSSECcombined = subset(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN , cpuresultscombined.
FIRSTTEN$server == "OSSEC")
288 cpuresultsFLOODLIGHTcombined = subset(cpuresultscombined.FIRSTTEN , cpuresultscombined
.FIRSTTEN$server == "Floodlight")
289 anova(lm(value ~ type , data = cpuresultsOSSECcombined))
290 anova(lm(value ~ type , data = cpuresultsFLOODLIGHTcombined))
291 pairwise.t.test(cpuresultsOSSECcombined$value , cpuresultsOSSECcombined$type , p.adjust
.method = "holm")
292 pairwise.t.test(cpuresultsFLOODLIGHTcombined$value , cpuresultsFLOODLIGHTcombined$type
, p.adjust.method = "holm")
293
294 ## -- POWER T-TEST -----------------------------------------------
295
296 power.t.test(sd = .3667 , delta = .02, power = .90)
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Appendix J. R Analysis Script: Load Tests
1 library(ggplot2)
2 library(plyr)
3
4 ## Create Summary function
5 ## Summarizes data.
6 ## Gives count , mean , standard deviation , standard error of the mean , and confidence
interval (default 95%).
7 ## data: a data frame.
8 ## measurevar: the name of a column that contains the variable to be summariezed
9 ## groupvars: a vector containing names of columns that contain grouping variables
10 ## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to ignore NA ’s
11 ## conf.interval: the percent range of the confidence interval (default is 95%)
12 ## AUTHOR: http :// www.cookbook -r.com/Manipulating_data/Summarizing_data/
13 summarySE <- function(data=NULL , measurevar , groupvars=NULL , na.rm=FALSE , conf.
interval =.95, .drop=TRUE) {
14
15 # New version of length which can handle NA ’s: if na.rm==T, don ’t count them
16 length2 <- function (x, na.rm=FALSE) {
17 if (na.rm) sum(!is.na(x))
18 else length(x)
19 }
20
21 # This does the summary. For each group ’s data frame , return a vector with
22 # N, mean , and sd
23 datac <- ddply(data , groupvars , .drop=.drop ,
24 .fun = function(xx , col) {
25 c(N = length2(xx[[col]], na.rm=na.rm),
26 mean = mean (xx[[col]], na.rm=na.rm),
27 sd = sd (xx[[col]], na.rm=na.rm)
28 )
29 },
30 measurevar
31 )
32
33 # Rename the "mean" column
34 datac <- rename(datac , c("mean" = measurevar))
35
36 datac$se <- datac$sd / sqrt(datac$N) # Calculate standard error of the mean
37
38 # Confidence interval multiplier for standard error
39 # Calculate t-statistic for confidence interval:
40 # e.g., if conf.interval is .95, use .975 (above/below), and use df=N-1
41 ciMult <- qt(conf.interval /2 + .5, datac$N -1)
42 datac$ci <- datac$se * ciMult
43
44 return(datac)
45 }
46
47 #Given data frame , returns plot of response time difference vs EPS
48 createPlotEpsxDiff <- function(dataset=NULL , labeltext=NULL , xpos=0, ypos =0) {
49 ggplot(dataset , aes(x=eps , y=difference)) +
50 geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=difference -ci, ymax=difference+ci), width =5) +
51 geom_line(col="blue", size =1) +
52 geom_smooth(method=lm , color="red", se=TRUE) +
53 geom_text(data = NULL , x = xpos , y = ypos , label=labeltext) +
54 geom_point () +
55 geom_ribbon(aes(ymin=difference -ci, ymax=difference+ci), alpha =0.2) +
56 labs(size=4, x="Events Per Second",y="Response Time (s)") +
57 theme_bw () +
58 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold
"))
59 }
60
61 #Given consolidated data frame with every response type , plots time difference vs EPS
62 createPlotALL <- function(dataset=NULL) {
63 ggplot(dataset , aes(x=eps , y=difference , fill=type , linetype=type)) +
64 geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=difference -ci, ymax=difference+ci), width =5) +
65 geom_line () +
66 geom_point () +
67 geom_ribbon(aes(ymin=difference -ci, ymax=difference+ci), alpha =0.2) +
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68 labs(size=4, x="Events Per Second",y="Response Time (s)",fill="Type",linetype="
Type") +
69 theme_bw () +
70 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold
"))
71 }
72
73 # - NEW LOG ONLY --------------------------------------------------------
74
75 log .10.1 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-1- NEWlog20TRIALS -data.csv")
76 #log .10.10 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-10- logonly -data.csv")
77 #log .10.100 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-100 - logonly -data.csv")
78 log .10.10 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-10- NEWlog20TRIALS -data.csv")
79 log .10.100 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-100 - NEWlog10TRIALS -data.csv")
80 log .10.250 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-250 - logonly -data.csv")
81 log .10.500 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-500 - logonly -data.csv")
82 log .10.750 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-750 - logonly -data.csv")
83 log .10.1000 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10 -1000 - logonly -data.csv")
84
85 logCombined = rbind(log .10.1000 , log .10.750 , log .10.500 , log .10.250 , log .10.100 , log
.10.10 , log .10.1)
86 logCombined$type = "Log -Only"
87
88 logStressSE = summarySE(logCombined , measurevar = "difference", groupvars = c("type",
"eps"))
89
90 createPlotEpsxDiff(dataset = logStressSE)
91
92 # - FIREWALL --------------------------------------------------------
93
94 firewall .10.1 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-1- NEWfirewall20TRIALSSS -data.csv")
95 #firewall .10.10 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10-10- firewallnossl2 -data.csv")
96 firewall .10.100 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -100- firewallssl3 -data.csv")
97 firewall .10.10 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10-10- NEWfirewall20TRIALSS -data.csv")
98 #firewall .10.100 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -100- NEWfirewall10TRIALSS -data.csv")
99 #firewall .10.250 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -250- firewallssl -data.csv")
100 firewall .10.250 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -250- NEWfirewall5TRIALS -data.csv")
101 firewall .10.500 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -500- firewallssl -data.csv")
102 firewall .10.750 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -750- firewall3 -data.csv")
103 firewall .10.1000 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -1000 - firewall -data.csv")
104
105 # fix EPS column
106 firewall .10.10 $eps = 100
107 firewall .10.100 $eps = 1000
108 firewall .10.250 $eps = 2500
109 firewall .10.500 $eps = 5000
110 firewall .10.750 $eps = 7500
111 firewall .10.1000 $eps = 10000
112 #firewall .10.2500 $eps = 25000
113
114 firewallCombined = rbind(firewall .10.1000 , firewall .10.750 , firewall .10.500 , firewall
.10.250 , firewall .10.100 , firewall .10.10 , firewall .10.1)
115 firewallCombined$type = "Firewall"
116
116
117 firewallStressSE = summarySE(firewallCombined , measurevar = "difference", groupvars =
c("type","eps"))
118 #firewallStressBashSE = summarySE(firewallCombinedSE , measurevar = "difference.ARbash
", groupvars = "eps")
119
120 createPlotEpsxDiff(dataset=firewallStressSE)
121
122 # - ACL --------------------------------------------------------
123
124 acl .10.1 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-1- NEWacl20TRIALS -data.csv")
125 #acl .10.10 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-10- aclnossl -data.csv")
126 #acl .10.100 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-100 - aclnossl -data.csv")
127 acl .10.10 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-10- NEWacl20TRIALS -data.csv")
128 acl .10.100 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-100 - NEWacl10TRIALSS -data.csv")
129 acl .10.250 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-250 - aclnossl -data.csv")
130 acl .10.500 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-500 - aclnossl -data.csv")
131 acl .10.750 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-750 - aclnossl -data.csv")
132 acl .10.1000 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10 -1000 - aclnossl -data.csv")
133 #acl .10.2500 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10 -2500 - firewall -data.csv")
134
135 aclCombined = rbind(acl .10.1000 , acl .10.750 , acl .10.500 , acl .10.250 , acl .10.100 , acl
.10.10 , acl .10.1)
136 aclCombined$type = "ACL"
137
138 aclStressSE = summarySE(aclCombined , measurevar = "difference", groupvars = c("type",
"eps"))
139 #aclStressBashSE = summarySE(aclCombined , measurevar = "difference.ARbash", groupvars
= "eps")
140
141 createPlotEpsxDiff(dataset = aclStressSE)
142
143 # - STATIC FLOW --------------------------------------------------------
144
145 static .10.1 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-1- NEWstatic20TRIALS -data.csv")
146 #static .10.10 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-10- staticflownossl -data.csv")
147 #static .10.100 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -100- staticflownossl -data.csv")
148 static .10.10 = read.csv("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-10- NEWstatic20TRIALS -data.csv")
149 static .10.100 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-100 - NEWstatic10TRIALS -data.csv")
150 #static .10.250 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -250- staticflownossl -data.csv")
151 #static .10.250 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -250- NEWstatic5TRIALS -data.csv")
152 static .10.250 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-250 - NEWstatic1TRIAL -data.csv")
153 static .10.500 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-500 - staticflownossl -data.csv")
154 static .10.750 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results
\\10-750 - staticflownossl -data.csv")
155 static .10.1000 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive \\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -1000 - staticflownossl -data.csv")
156
157 staticCombined = rbind(static .10.1000 , static .10.750 , static .10.500 , static .10.250 ,
static .10.100 , static .10.10 , static .10.1)
158 staticCombined$type = "Static Flow"
159
160 staticStressSE = summarySE(staticCombined , measurevar = "difference", groupvars = c("
type","eps"))
161 createPlotEpsxDiff(dataset = staticStressSE)
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162
163 # - ALL TYPES COMBINED --------------------------------------------------------
164
165 #test boxplot
166 loadtest.ALL.RAW = rbind(staticCombined , logCombined , firewallCombined , aclCombined)
167 loadtest.ALL.RAW$eps = as.factor(loadtest.ALL.RAW$eps)
168 ggplot(loadtest.ALL.RAW , aes(x=eps , y=difference , fill=type)) +
169 geom_boxplot () +
170 ggtitle("") +
171 labs(size=4, x="EPS Level",y="Response Time (s)") +
172 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
, plot.title = element_text(size = rel (2)))
173
174 #Line plots RT all combined load test
175 allCombinedSE = rbind(aclStressSE , firewallStressSE , staticStressSE , logStressSE)
176 createPlotALL(dataset = allCombinedSE)
177
178 # Calculating the biggest gap
179 allCombinedSE [12, "difference"] - allCombinedSE [12, "ci"] - allCombinedSE [24, "
difference"] + allCombinedSE [24, "ci"]
180
181
182 # --- CPU ALL ----------------------------------------
183 input = "cpu -all"
184 filename = paste(input , ".csv", sep="")
185 filepath = paste("C:\\ Users \\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\ Results \\",
filename , sep="")
186 cpuALL = read.csv(filepath)
187
188 ggplot(cpuALL , aes(x=eps , y=cpu.ossec , fill=type , linetype=type , color=type)) +
189 ylim (0 ,100) +
190 geom_line () +
191 geom_point () +
192 labs(size=4, x="Events Per Second",y="CPU Utilization (%)",fill="Type", linetype="
Type", color="Type") +
193 theme_bw () +
194 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
)
195
196 # - REGRESSION MODELS --------------------------------------------------------
197
198 regressionACL = lm(difference ~ eps , data = aclStressSE)
199 regressionFIREWALL = lm(difference ~ eps , data = firewallStressSE)
200 regressionLOG = lm(difference ~ eps , data = logStressSE)
201 regressionSTATIC = lm(difference ~ eps , data = staticStressSE)
202
203 coeffACL = round(regressionACL$coefficients , 5)
204 modelText = paste("Model : ", coeffACL [1] , " + " , coeffACL [2] , "*x" , "\n\n" , "P-
value adjusted = ",round(summary(regressionACL)$adj.r.squared ,2))
205 createPlotEpsxDiff(dataset = aclStressSE , labeltext = modelText , xpos = 2500, ypos =
3)
206
207 coeffFIREWALL = round(regressionFIREWALL$coefficients , 5)
208 modelText = paste("Model : ", coeffFIREWALL [1] , " + " , coeffFIREWALL [2] , "*x" , "\
n\n" , "P-value adjusted = ",round(summary(regressionFIREWALL)$adj.r.squared ,2))
209 createPlotEpsxDiff(dataset = firewallStressSE , labeltext = modelText , xpos = 2500,
ypos = 6)
210
211 coeffLOG = round(regressionLOG$coefficients , 5)
212 modelText = paste("Model : ", coeffLOG [1] , " + " , coeffLOG [2] , "*x" , "\n\n" , "P-
value adjusted = ",round(summary(regressionLOG)$adj.r.squared ,2))
213 createPlotEpsxDiff(dataset = logStressSE , labeltext = modelText , xpos = 2500, ypos =
1.1)
214
215 coeffSTATIC = round(regressionSTATIC$coefficients , 5)
216 modelText = paste("Model : ", coeffSTATIC [1] , " + " , coeffSTATIC [2] , "*x" , "\n\n"
, "P-value adjusted = ",round(summary(regressionSTATIC)$adj.r.squared ,2))
217 createPlotEpsxDiff(dataset = staticStressSE , labeltext = modelText , xpos = 2500, ypos
= 3.5)
218
219 confint(regressionACL)
220 confint(regressionSTATIC)
221 confint(regressionLOG)
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222 confint(regressionFIREWALL)
223
224 #combined model
225 loadtest.ALL.RAW$type = as.factor(loadtest.ALL.RAW$type)
226 allRAWSE = summarySE(loadtest.ALL.RAW , measurevar = "difference", groupvars = c("eps"
))
227 regressionALLRAW = lm(difference ~ eps * type - 1, data = loadtest.ALL.RAW)
228 summary(regressionALLRAW)
229 coeffALLRAW = round(regressionALLRAW$coefficients , 5)
230 modelText = paste("Model : ", coeffALLRAW [1] , " + " , coeffALLRAW [2] , "*x" , "\n\n"
, "P-value adjusted = ",round(summary(regressionALLRAW)$adj.r.squared ,2))
231 ggplot(loadtest.ALL.RAW , aes(x=eps , y=difference , group = 1)) +
232 geom_smooth(method=lm, formula = loadtest.ALL.RAW$difference ~ loadtest.ALL.RAW$eps
+ loadtest.ALL.RAW$type - 1, color="red", se=TRUE) +
233 ggtitle("") +
234 labs(size=4, x="EPS Level",y="Response Time (s)") +
235 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
, plot.title = element_text(size = rel (2)))
236
237 #plotting the sample custom function
238 fun.1 <- function(x) .8 * (.42869 + .00007 * x) + .05 * (.46778 + .00033 * x) +
.05 * (.23732 + .00059 * x) + .1 * (.49669 + .00027 * x)
239 fun.high <- function(x) .8 * (.52737 + .00009 * x) + .05 * (.85834 + .00040 * x) +
.05 * (.98458 + .00072 * x) + .1 * (.68054 + .00030 * x)
240 fun.low <- function(x) .8 * (.33000 + .00005 * x) + .05 * (.07721 + .00024 * x) +
.05 * ( -.50995 + .00045 * x) + .1 * (.31284 + .00025 * x)
241
242 ggplot(data.frame(x = 0), aes(x = x)) +
243 stat_function(fun = fun.1) +
244 xlim(0, 10000) +
245 ylim (0.0, 2.5) +
246 labs(size=4, x="EPS Level",y="Response Time (s)") +
247 theme_bw () +
248 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
, legend.position="none")
249
250
251 #Inputting and plotting the dynamic test data
252 dynamic .10.500 = read.csv("C:\\ Users\\ jgoodgion \\ Google Drive\\AFIT\\ Research \\
Results \\10 -500- NEWdynamic2 -data.csv")
253 dynamicSE = summarySE(dynamic .10.250 , measurevar = "difference", groupvars = c("eps")
)
254
255 ggplot(data.frame(x = 0), aes(x = x)) +
256 stat_function(fun = fun.1) +
257 stat_function(fun = fun.high , aes(colour = "red")) +
258 stat_function(fun = fun.low , aes(colour = "red")) +
259 geom_point(aes(x = 5000, y = 1.04), shape=4, color="blue", size =5) +
260 xlim(0, 10000) +
261 ylim (0.0, 2.5) +
262 labs(size=4, x="EPS Level",y="Response Time (s)") +
263 theme_bw () +
264 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
, legend.position="none")
265
266
267 # - INDIVIDUAL ALERT MODELS --------------------------------------------------------
268
269 static .10.750 $index = seq.int(nrow(static .10.750))
270 ggplot(static .10.750 , aes(x=index , y=difference)) +
271 geom_point(size =1) +
272 ggtitle("Linear Model of Increasing Individual Alerts") +
273 xlim (0 ,10000) +
274 ylim(0, 6) +
275 labs(size=4, x="Alert ID",y="Response Time (s)") +
276 geom_smooth(method=lm, formula=y~x, color="red", fullrange=TRUE) +
277 theme(axis.text=element_text(size =12), axis.title=element_text(size=14,face="bold")
, plot.title = element_text(size = rel (2)))
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Appendix K. Trial Ranges
Figure 34. Static Flow RT quartile ranges (per trial at 500 EPS)
Figure 35. Log-Only RT quartile ranges (per trial at 500 EPS)
120
Figure 36. Firewall RT quartile ranges (per trial at 500 EPS)
Figure 37. ACL RT quartile ranges (per trial at 500 EPS)
121
Appendix L. CPU Data Reduction
Figure 38. All OSSEC CPU utilization measurements (500 EPS)
Figure 39. Reduced OSSEC CPU utilization measurements (500 EPS)
122
Figure 40. All Floodlight CPU utilization measurements (500 EPS)
Figure 41. Reduced Floodlight CPU utilization measurements (500 EPS)
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Appendix M. Threat Level Classification
Table 11. Internal OSSEC threat level classification descriptors [7]
Level Description
01 None
02
System low priority notification - System notification or status messages. They
have no security relevance.
03
Successful/Authorized events - They include successful login attempts, firewall
allow events, etc.
04
System low priority error - Errors related to bad configurations or unused
devices/applications. They have no security relevance and are usually caused by
default installations or software testing.
05
User generated error - They include missed passwords, denied actions, etc. By
itself they have no security relevance.
06
Low relevance attack - They indicate a worm or a virus that have no affect to the
system (like code red for apache servers, etc). They also include frequently IDS
events and frequently errors.
07
Bad word matching. They include words like bad, error, etc. These events are
most of the time unclassified and may have some security relevance.
08
First time seen - Include first time seen events. First time an IDS event is fired or
the first time an user logged in. If you just started using OSSEC HIDS these
messages will probably be frequently. After a while they should go away, It also
includes security relevant actions (like the starting of a sniffer or something like
that).
09
Error from invalid source - Include attempts to login as an unknown user or from
an invalid source. May have security relevance (specially if repeated). They also
include errors regarding the admin (root) account.
10
Multiple user generated errors - They include multiple bad passwords, multiple
failed logins, etc. They may indicate an attack or may just be that a user just
forgot his credencials.
11
Integrity checking warning - They include messages regarding the modification of
binaries or the presence of rootkits (by rootcheck). If you just modified your
system configuration you should be fine regarding the syscheck messages. They
may indicate a successful attack. Also included IDS events that will be ignored
(high number of repetitions).
12
High importancy event - They include error or warning messages from the system,
kernel, etc. They may indicate an attack against a specific application.
13
Unusual error (high importance) - Most of the times it matches a common attack
pattern.
14
High importance security event. Most of the times done with correlation and it
indicates an attack.
15 Severe attack - No chances of false positives. Immediate attention is necessary.
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